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"The religious spirit will be
revived "because it will be in har-
mony with men's unquestioned sci-
entific beliefs and their ordinary
day -by -day social activities, ****
When philosophy shall have co-ope-
rated with the course of events,
and made clear and coherent the
meaning of the daily detail, sci-
ence and emotion will interpene-
trate, practice and imagination
will embrace. Poetry and religi
ous feeling will be the unforced
flowers of life. To further this
articulation and revelation of the
meanings of the current course of
events is the task and problem of
philosophy in days of transition."
— JOHN DEWEI
from
Reconstruction in Philosophy
<0
•
FOREWORD
Gradually the Christian world is realizing
the breadth and fertility of the field of Religious
Education, Surveys, theoretical as well as practi-
cal, have finally charted its concerns in such a way
as to distinguish its logical divisions: 1.) Pre -
suppositions : theological, philosophical, and peda-
gogical viewpoints from which it should be approached;
2.) Sources : basic biological, sociological, and psy-
chological principles in which its programs must be
grounded; 3.) Methods : processes by which religi-
ous educators, proceeding from these viewpoints, and
drawing on these sources, may realize their possibi-
lities; 4.) Products : the religious values, i.e.
improved Christian leadership and enriched Christian
character that such procedure should yield.
This dissertation will treat only the first
two aspects of Religious Education according to this
classification: presuppositions and sources , which,
properly correlated, give rise to ideals as dynamic
norms for moral conduct. It will consider methods
and products incidentally as the ends for which this
line of reasoning furnishes logical justification but
•
will attempt no exhaustive description or appraisal
of them.
As the term "ideal" implies, the treatment
will emphasize the primacy of ideational factors in
the establishment of authoritative standards for Re-
ligious Education. Thus:
Chapter I will show how rational theolo-
gies and idealistic philosophies, consistent within
themselves and with each other, demand Religious Edu-
cation as a realization of their Implications, and,
by providing its presuppositions, define its major
objectives.
Chapters II, III, and IV, will demonstrate
that these idealistic objectives are not "purely
speculative," as is frequently contended, "vaporous,"
"visionary," but securely grounded in certain exact
sciences, notably: Biology, which furnishes the
principle of psychotropic evolution with its emphasis
on "intelligence" as the determining element in na-
tural development (Chapter II); Sociology, which,
through its consideration of problems of heredity,
leads eventually to euthenics, as the most rational
and practical solution of problems of social adjust-
ment (Chapter III); Psychology, which, in its more
recent configurationist and personalistic formula-
(0
I
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tions, provides a scientific basis for an ideal-moti-
vated pedagogy (Chapter IV ).
Chapter V will show how such ideational
determinism in Religious Education will give it a cur-
ricular content and scientific method capable of pro-
ducing the ethical and mystical values, which consti-
tute Christian character.
As this foreview of its contents reveals,
the method of treatment in the dissertation will be
dialectic in the etymological sense of that term. It
will seek to show how the very nature of Religious
Education drives one logically from principle to prin-
ciple, each scientifically deduced, until an ultimate
is reached in ideals, so inculcated as to supply the
positive pull of loyalties and values, without which
character is meaningless.
Obviously, since so many sciences and dis-
ciplines are involved, an independent demonstration
of each point, supplemented by complete documentation,
is impossiole. Recognized authorities, such as Thom-
son in biology, Galton and Mendel on heredity, the
chief problem of sociological significance considered
here, and Calkins, McDougall, and Koffka in psycholo-
gy, are relied upon for dependable data from those
fields.
•
Similarly, materials have "been borrowed
from literature, not only because they illuminate and
emphasize points already demonstrated, but, more co-
gently, because, in many instances, they embody i-
deals which are normative for Religious Education.
Further Justification for the use of poetry in parti-
1
cular is to be found in J. A, Leighton' s contention
that
"the more serious poetry of the race has
a philosophical structure of thought. It
contains beliefs and conceptions in re-
gard to the nature of man and the uni-
verse, G-od and the soul, fate, and provi-
dence, suffering, evil, and destiny.
Great poetry always has, like the higher
religion, a metaphysical content. It
deals with the same august experiences
and conceptions as metaphysics or philo-
sophy. But poetry is more concrete, vi-
vid, and dramatic in its treatment of these
high themes; it is more Intuitive in its
thought processes and expressions than phi-
losophy."
Andrew Seth Pringle-Pattison is even more specific
on the matter:
2
"It is possible," he says , "that some
readers will think that I have drawn too
frequently upon the poets. That is, per-
haps, a question of temperament. But my
procedure was, at any rate, deliberate;
for I accept Wordsworth* s description of
poetry as 'the breath and finer spirit of
all knowledge' and I am even ready to be
persuaded by Mr. Yeats that 'whatever of
philosophy has been made poetry is alone
permanent"
•
1. The Field of Philosophy, p. 33.
2. The Idea oT~G-od
, p. vli.
••
It la manifestly a corollary of these spe-
cifications that the cnief originality of the disser-
tation lies in its organization rather than its ma-
terials. It admittedly derives its facts from vari-
ous sciences but it so interprets and systematizes
them as to show their convergence on the single prob-
lem of character-training under religious auspices.
This has not Deen done before with anything approxima-
ting scientific precision and thoroughness, as its
reviews of the more important books in the field will
demonstrate.
The bibliographies for the dissertation
will be both general: books dealing with Religious
Education as a whole; and special : books or arti-
cles which elaborate its major principles, psychotro-
pic evolution, euthenlcs, and ideals.
The writer is especially obligated to Dr.
W. S. Athearn, under whose Instruction he first learn-
ed to appreciate the Importance of Religious Education;
Dr. Edgar S. Brightman, who suggested the principle
of limitation by which its rationale could be reduced
to a workable compass; and Dr. Albert C. Knudson, un-
der whose faculty -supervision the dissertation is
written.
— EARL MARLATT
.
Boston,
May 19, 1929.
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"He is a great man who makes it
his concern to utilize the senses,
spending, as it were, the wealth of
the citizens in thus providing for
his own salvation and the salvation
of many. And he is no less a man
who has made philosophy a stepping
stone to the things invisible."
ST. BERNARD,
De Consideration
,
V, ii, 3.

CHAPTER I.
NATURE and PRESUPPOSITIONS of
RELIGIOUS EDUCATION
Irving Babbitt, in his lectures at Harvard
1
University
,
argues brilliantly and cogently for ra-
tional appraisals as over against the regime of pre-
judice Inaugurated and maintained by an undisciplined
romanticism. Conversely, Rudolf Otto, in his lumi-
nous, or to coin from his own terminology an even
more golden adjective numinous, book, Das Heili-
ge, argues with equal cogency and brilliance for ir-
rational .factors in experience, particularly the emo-
tional and mystical, as the essence of religious
feeling, and, eventually, of final truth. Theodore
Gr, Soares, attempting to reconcile the two positions
and to utilize the synthesis for Religious Education ,
2
pleads in his book of that title for a "revaluation
of prejudice" such as will allow the rational to e-
merge from the irrational or the super-rational as a
river from a glacier or a drawing from a background,
against which its fuller meaning becomes apparent.
1. Cf . his book, Rousseau and Roman -
ticism
,
Boston, Houghton-Mifflin, 1919.
2. Chap. XX, pp. 206-222.
2

This suggests that the
Current Misconceptions true nature of Religious
of
'
Religious Education; Education may be rational-
ly apprehended and apprais-
ed by an inquiry into prejudicial misconceptions of
it, popular as well as critical.
The former grow, for the most part, out of
Popular an over-emotionalized, not to say sentimen-
talized, conception of religion which iden-
tifies it with revivalism and holds that Religious
Education is "a substitute for evangelism," "a pro-
1
test against Sunday Schools" , or "an experimental
innovation." While grounded in convictions deserving
of respect, these characterizations turn out to be
mistaken appraisals as only a little perspectival,
rather than prejudicial, thinking will demonstrate.
1. It is not improbable that this misconception
arises out of such statements as this from Soares's
Religious Education
, p. 262: "Much of this confusion
results from the existence of the Sunday school as
an organization separate from the church. The com-
plete abolition of the school would be a long step in
advance. It is an obsolete institution. Historical-
ly the Sunday school was a lay movement of religious
education which formed an alliance with the church.
The Sunday school superintendent has always regarded
himself as the head of the institution. The time has
come for the church to resume its function of religi-
ous education, for the minister to resume his function
of educational direction, for the separate institu-
tion of a religious school to be abandoned."

Religious Education is not, and does not
pretend to be, a substitute for revivals. It comes,
not to supplant, but to supplement, evangelism. The
Scriptural text on which it is based is II Peter 1:5:
"Add to your faith virtue, and to virtue knowledge;"
or John 8:32: "And ye shall know the truth and the
truth shall make you free," And yet it is not, as its
detractors assert, "a devastating rationalism" substi-
tuting reason for faith; rather is it a practical
personalism, grounded in reason-and-vision. Religion
moves both ways between these poles. There are those
who enter the Temple by "the Beautiful G-ate;" there
are others who find the entrance easier by the rati-
onal or the ritualistic or the mystical gates. Reli-
gious Education recognizes and utilizes all of these
approaches. The Important thing, as it sees it, is
not the gate taken but the God-Spirit found and intro-
duced into life as a controlling factor. 0-od in ex-
perience, molding character . .... this is Religious
Education; also evangelism.
Nor is Religious Education "a protest a-
gainst Sunday Schools." While it decries the futili-
ty of much that passes, in uncritical thinking, for
"character-building," its major emphases make it es-
1c
sentially a program rather than a protest. It pro-
poses not to discard, but to develop, Sunday Schools
by giving them standards and methods that will in-
sure their more effective functioning. Thus seen, it
becomes tremendously captivating to minds that consi-
der spiritual values of more significance than tradi-
tional institutions.
The third objection "It is an experi-
mental innovation" dissolves even more precipi-
tately than the other two if one approaches Religious
Education from a Weltanschauung rather than a provin-
cially, or denominationally, religious viewpoint.
Religious Education is as old as Protestantism and
older. It is a corollary of the belief in private
Judgment and personal interpretations which precipi-
tated the Reformation. Luther realized as much and,
accordingly, commissioned Melancthon to educate the
people in the true faith. And back of Luther was
1
Bernard and Aleuin and Bede of Jarrow and Origen and
Clement of Alexandria and Justin Martyr ••••• all
exponents of Religious Education, asking its norma-
tive questions: Is our faith intellectually respec-
table? Is it fruitful for life? It is not inslgni-
1. Cf. the author's Protestant Saints , pp. 41-
69.

f leant that the Disciples called Jesus "Master" and
that Paul, prescribing a formula for Church organiza-
1
tion, wrote to the Corinthians : "God hath set some
in the church, first apostles, secondly prophets,
thirdly teachers , then miracles, then gifts of heal-
2
ings, helps, governments, divers kinds of tongues,"
The more critical aberrations with regard
Critical to Religious Education are less easily dis-
covered and oorrected because they are in-
extricably involved with much that is valid. Lately
they have come to expression in two very significant
books: Frinc lples of Religious Education , by Earl E.
3
Emme and Paul Stevick ; Religious Education , by The-
4
odore G-erald Scares , whose position on "prejudice"
has already been cited and commended.
The best and the worst thing that can be
Emme said about the former is that it "thunders"
and
Stevick too loudly "in the index." With a sort of
holy audacity Emme and Stevick set out to
compress the science of Religious Education into two
hundred and seventy-nine pages with generous margins
1. I Corinthians 12:28. 2. Cf. Ephesians 4:11.
3. New York, the Macmillan Company, 1926.
4. Chicago, The University of Chicago Press,
1928.
t
and liberal appendices of supplementary questions
and "bibliographies. The enormity of the attempt
makes the book captivating; it also Just as surely
limits the extent of its conquest. Vision it a-
chieves but not the revision which yields final va-
lues. Nevertheless it gives a whole view, however ha-
zy, of the field of Religious Education, and this is
attainment enough to make it worthy of consideration
by serious students of religion*
The authors give one part in their book
to each of the four divisions of Religious Education,
charted in the "Foreword" to this dissertation —
-
presuppositions, sources, methods, products under
the respective headings: "Human Nature;" "Aims;"
"Means;" "Leadership." Accordingly the work attains
1
the goal which it sets for itself : "to obtain a sin-
gle, comprehensive, balanced view, an at-
tempt at basic organization into a coherent
whole of all the elements in the science of
Religious Education." At the same time it makes its
title a misnomer, since it deals only superficially
with the "principles" of Religious Education and at
equal length and depth with its presuppositions, me-
thods, and products. A more appropriate title for
1. Preface, p. 9.
I
the book would have been "An Introduction to Religi-
ous Education,
"
In discussing "Human Nature" the authors
admirably emphasize: 1.) Its educabillty; 2,) Its
grounding in, and natural gravitation toward, divini-
ty; 3.) Its personal responsibility for the degree
of education and divinity achieved. The position is
well taken but not securely fortified. The treatment
wisely tries to conserve the truth in both the "psy-
chological" and the "sociological" viewpoints. In
the process, however, it finds them irreconcilable
and ends in unstable equilibrium between them. The
more excellent way out of the dilemma is to see in
the so-called "psychological" position the biological
viewpoint that it really is, to recognize the socio-
logical viewpoint as its antithesis, and to find the
synthesis of these apparent contradictions in a self-
psychological viewpoint which sees the person as an
individual a biological organism, an unfolding,
developing bit of germ-plasm in social, environ-
mental relations, which affect but do not necessari-
ly determine its adjustments to them. This is admit-
tedly "caviar to the general," but it is fundamental
for anyone who aspires to master even the first
"principles" of Religious Education.

In presenting the latter Enune and Stevick
properly make the aim of Religious Education the ap-
plication of scientific method to the production of
1
moral and religious values, or —- to quote them
such an ordering of experience as will "help the in-
dividual increasingly to understand, ap-
preciate, and participate in the Christian
way of living fruitfully in this world."
The elaboration of the means for achieving this end
gives the authors' discussion of the religious educa-
tive process. This is the most significant part of
Emme's and Stevick 1 s book. It holds that a develop-
ing mind can be made moral and religious not by cate-
chetical exercise or mechanical projects but only by
life -exper 1 enc es in which moral and religious prin-
ciples are consciously seen to function. Accordingly
curricula and administration must be flexibly adapted
to pupils and situations if the method is to produce
persons of dynamic character rather then puppets,
parroting a creed or incarnating a code.
The fruitage of such growth in personality
is, according to the last section in the book, "reli-
gious leadership." The ideas here are valid enough
but the expression occasionally falls to the level
1. Principles of Religious Education, p. 75
c
of class -meeting bromides, pious "sound and fury, sig-
nifying nothing," Perhaps the very excellence of the
preceding "Part" makes the conclusion, by contrast,
ant i -c1imact eric
.
Even so, the book is significant if not fi-
nal. Along with its over-clamorous thunder there is
enough critical lightning and rain to clear the muggy
atmosphere which has characterized the popular atti-
tude toward Religious Education. Emme and Stevick
do not sink a deep furrow but they do find and fence
the field; and that is much.
Soares comes to grief on the religious ra-
Soares ther than the psychological reef. Much of
his book is admirable, perhaps, the best
work yet done in the field of Religious Education.
He deals with all its aspects, as his closing state-
ment in the "introduction" shows:
"We shall consider the nature and educabili-
ty of the human material with which we work
(chaps, i-iii) ; the nature of the religion
with which education is concerned today (chaps,
iv and v) ; certain fundamental characteris-
tics of the educational process, especially in
its social aspects (chaps, vi-xli) ; and the
experience of membership in the worshiping
group (chaps, xiii-xv).
Moreover he properly grounds the movement in biolo-
gy and sociology and gives it psychological respecta-
c
bility "by making its subjects individuals in group re-
lations, finally to be Judged by their "social behavi-
1
or." He conceives of education as "directed experi-
ence" without capitulating to a project method untem-
pered by conscious purpose and evaluation. He argues
2
that such an educational process will develop :
"habits , which will be desirable ways of acting
that need no deliberation; skills , which will
be the abilities to do whatever is necessary in
efficient living; attitudes , which will be the
desirable emotional reactions in the situations
that develop; knowledges , which will be the bo-
dies of usable information; appreciations , which
will be the feelings of value of all that the
growing person should experience; and Ideals ,
which will be the pictures of conduct nobler
than is customary. The aim of all this, he in-
sists, will be primarily and finally "the integration
of personality." Accordingly he seems to be sound on
most of the presuppositions, sources and methods of
Religious Education, and in general on its product,
the Integrated personality. His error lies in his pre-
scription for the latter, particularly in his insist-
ence that this goal can be reached more effectively
through the mystical experience of worship than through
the ethical experience of varied activities yielding
moral and religious values.
1. See Chap. I, pp. 5-6.
2. Introduction, p. xv.

This aberration is hard to explain in a
man of Soares's prevailingly pragmatlstic temper.
The latter leads him to protest, at times, conscious-
ly or unconsciously, against his own major premise
that the final function of Religious Education is to
equip persons for participation in worship. Thus he
1
cautions against ecclesiasticism "by asserting that
"the church is, after all, only a means
to an end. Religious living in the larger
society and not too great loyalty to any
institution is our goal. We must "be Jealous
of any technique that would tend to routi-
nize the vital ethical religion, which we
are utterly unwilling to think of in any
terms hut that of social passion;" and, a-
2
gain, in discussing the evils of credalism : "The
question is how a Christian should act fair-
ly in the social relations in which these
hoys and girls are living; how the kindly
life should be carried on with the people
whom they meet; what they can believe that
will make them strong, patient, and courage-
ous; what experience of fellowship with G-od
is possible for them, and what it will mean
in the motivation of conduct." At the same
time Soares so far makes the aim of Religious Educa-
tion what he terms "the experience of Churchmanshlp"
3
as to say : "There is practically no reference to
Religious Education in the New Testament.
Ministers looking for texts have often de-
1. Chap. XIII, p. 257.
2. Ibid., p. 270.
3. Ibid., p. 254.
It
plored their paucity. Beyond a few ex-
hortations regarding parental discipline,
the matter seems to be ignored."
Such a statement as this is unthinkable if
one conceives of the products of Religious Education
in terms not of Churchmanship but of character; such
a self -discovery and self -development as Jesus had in
mind when he said, "What will a man give in exchange
for his soul?"; and to the rich young man, "G-o sell
all that thou hast and give to the poor;" such a
growth in selfhood as Edwin Markham describes in the
quatrain:
"There is a destiny that makes us brothers,
None goes his way alone;
All that we give into the lives of others
Comes back into our own."
Soares appreciates this, too. In the main, his empha-
sis on sociality is sound. In fact his major error
is directly traceable to an over -social emphasis
which lures him from personalism into pantheism and
makes a mystical rather than an ethical accent impera-
tive.
This suggests the signifl-
The Background cance of background in arrl-
of
Religious Education : ving at any fundamental con-
ception of Religious Educa-
tion. Presuppositions determine trends which even-

tually dictate principles . These , In turn , prescribe
processes and provide the norms by which products may
be appraised . One's metaphysical, ethical, sociologi-
cal, theological, pedagogical, and psychological view-
points are the sources from which his currents of Re-
ligious Education flow, and, as such, will eventually
determine the ocean into which they empty. It is ne-
cessary, then, that valid viewpoints be established in
each of these fields before any final definition of
Religious Education can be logically attempted.
Metaphysically, personalism offers the
Metaphysical firmest and deepest grounding for Re-
PersonalIsm ; ligious Education. There are several
reasons for this: 1.) Its high ap-
praisal of mind or personality as the validating prin-
ciple of reality coheres with the rationalizing ten-
dency of Religious Education; 2.) Its Kantian empha-
sis on the constitutive and creative activity of the
mind and on the possibility of freedom in this acti-
vity provides philosophical warrant for the initia-
tive and preferential functioning essential to cha-
racter-building; 3.) Its Leibnizlan and Lotzian in-
dividualism is consistent with the humanistic aspects
of Religious Education; 4.) Its concept of a person-
al God responsible for the activity of the universe
(
or macrocosm, to whoa Individual persons or micro-
cosms are in turn responsible, establishes personal re
sponsibility for morality this side of mechanistic re-
lativism In one direction and pantheistic determinism
in the other; 5.) Its allowance for the revelation
of such a personal God in the life and teachings of Je
sus, leaves the Christ -ideal the norm for character -v
a
lues which Religious Educators believe it to be.
Essential These affinities between personallsm and
Principles Religious Education are admirably suggest
ed if not specifically stated in John W.
1
Haas's "Personalistic Creed" :
"1.) I believe that the energy of the
universe demands will as its solution,
2.) I believe that tne order of the u-
niverse calls for intellect and purpose."
(This is Schopenhauer's "Wille" and "Vor-
3tellung n triumphing over positivism and materialism.)
"3.) I believe that tne oeauty of the
universe implies supreme feeling.
n4.) I oelieve that the moral implica-
tions of life Indicate ultimate goodness."
(This suggests Kant's "primacy of the prac-
tical reason"and, perhaps, Sorley's axiological argu-
ment for G-od as formulated in his Moral Values and
2
the Idea of G-od. )
1. The Personalist, III, 1, January, 1922, p. 4.
2. New York, G-. P. Putnam's Sons, 1919.
t
M
5«) I believe that the progress of
history points to final righteousness."
(Here there is a hint of Rlckert, impera-
tive Just now as an antidote for the post-bellum pes-
simism expressed by Oswald Spengler and others of equal
popularity.)
"6.) I believe that a sound theory
of education must posit universal human
freedom.
7. ) I believe that the best philoso-
phy of religion ends in the axiom of God
as spirit and love.
8. ) I believe that all these claims
are best united in the doctrine of person-
ality, divine and human, intellectual and
social. M
Adequate as this seems it leaves a funda-
mental problem unsolved: the explanation of the uni-
ty -in-plurality, clearly implied by tenets 1, 2, 4, 5»
and 8. This is possible under the theory of the imma-
nence of G-od, which holds that the One Spirit behind
the universe is causally, but not substantially, pre-
sent in all its activities, but experiences imperfect
expressions of Himself and incomplete realizations of
His purposes because of either Self -set limitations,
notably human freedom, or a principle of resistance in
His own nature; hence the manifold, paradoxically
good and evil, for which He is responsible but not cul-
pable, and in which He resides (immanent) but remains
1
above and beyond it ( transcendent ) , the "Spirit -bond"
1. Cf . Sorley, Moral Values and the Idea of G-od ,
p. 250 ff
.
<
that gives it meaning, coherence, value.
The idea comes to most lucid expression in
1
Bowne's The Immanence of God • In this the formula-
tor, if not the founder, of personalism reduces its
theory of God to four reciprocal concepts:
1. ) G-od is the ground of nature in that
He is the Purpose behind its causes and the Value be-
yond its effects;
2. ) God is evident in history as a force in-
fluencing the wills of men and directing the trend of
movements even more than in detached cases of divine
intervention; He is as surely the Cause of the usual
event as of the more unusual miracle in which the di-
vine Causation is only more obvious;
3. ) The Bible is a revelation of the grace
and righteousness of God and not a specific record;
the revelation may have been inerrant but the record
is not; accordingly the Scriptures should be inter-
preted as a whole rather than cross -sectionally, spi-
ritually not literally;
4. ) The essence of religion is not "experi-
ence" but obedience, a type of personal life in which
the will of man is so submissive to the will of God
that the Latter becomes the Great Causality in which
he "lives, moves, and has his being."
1. Boston, Houghton-Mifflin, 1905.
I
The pedagogical significance of per-
Pedagoglcal sonalism and of the immanence theolo-
Signlf Icance
gy in particular, lies in their impli-
cations with regard to the nature of
personality. If man is in any sense "made in G-od'
s
image," persons are organic wholes rather than piece-
meal parades of disconnected events. They are imma-
nent in their experiences but transcend them in their
Integrating function, which gives experiential data ad-
jectival or personal reference plus the coherence
sometimes called identity. Accordingly educational ex-
periences, consciously assimilated, not only condition
but constitute personality and give rational direction
1
to whatever immortality "flesh is heir to".
This theory of the nature of the self
a microcosm reflecting the macrocosm is elaborated
2
in the author's monograph, "What is a Person," appen-
ded to this dissertation. It eventually defines a
3
person as "an organic whole of reality, consisting
of a psycho-physical complex organized about an equal-
ly active, rational, dynamic center, and capable of
1. For fuller expositions of personallsm, see
Bowne, Personallsm ; Knudson, The Philosophy of Per-
sonallsm ; FTeweTTing, Creatlv
e
~Ter sonal
1
1y
.
2. Boston University Bulletin, XIV, 15, May, '25.
3. Page 17.
tc
carrying, creating, and perpetuating values." It ia to
be noted here that the person is the centered complex ,
and, so, essentially immanent rather than transcen-
dent.
There is danger at this point of an exagge-
rated immanence which leaves no distinction "between
persons and things and eventuates in an untenable pan-
theism*
This is Wilhelm Stern's error, as Dr. A. C.
1.
Knudson points out in his Philosophy of Personalism .
Stern begins promisingly enough with a definition of a
person that differentiates it sharply from things.
2
"A person," he says
,
"is that kind of be-
ing or existence which in spite of the plu-
rality of its parts constitutes a real,
unique, and intrinsically valuable unity,
and as such, in spite of the plurality of
the functions of its parts, achieves a uni-
tary, purposive, self-activity. A thing
(Sache; is the contradictory opposite of
person. It is that kind of being or exis-
tence which, consisting of many parts, con-
stitutes no real, unique, and intrinsically
valuable unity, and which, functioning in
the many functions of its parts, achieves
no unitary, purposive self-activity. 11
But he eventually identifies persons and things in the
mind of God so that the distinction between them turns
1. Pages 25-30.
2. Quoted from Stern's Person and Sache , I, p.
16, in Knudson' s The Philosophy of Personallsm , p. 27.
<c
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out to be specious rather than real.
The way out of the dilemma lies, it is evi-
dent, in a recognition of transcendent as well as im-
manent f eactors in personality such as will preserve
its individuality in sociality even against the power
of an all-pervading Mind or Consciousness, Who causes
it but is not wholly identified with it. As Dr.
1
Brightman expresses the idea
,
"The monistic theory seeks to state the re-
lation of God and man in terms of the cate-
gory of whole and part. This category, how-
ever, breaks down when it attempts to de-
scribe personal relations. The more illumi-
nating category is that of purpose, which, on
our view, determines what wholes and parts
shall be in the universe. The monist right-
ly holds that the divine purpose is supreme;
but we can give a self -consistent interpre-
tation of the facts only on the view that it
is the divine purpose that there shall be se-
parate finite persons, on whom God acts inti-
mately and constantly without their being a
part of him. In himself man finds signs of
God and of God's nearness and activity. Yet
man is always himself and God is God. They
are mutually transcendent in a sense in which
God and nature are not. Most of the states
of my mind are, it is true, caused not by my
self -determining will, but by God. This is
true of my sensations and of all of me that is
due to physiological and psychological mecha-
nisms. Nevertheless, all conscious processes
in me, whether caused by God's purpose or my
own, are parts of my complex, unitary person-
ality, which, though dependent on God for its
being, is self -experiencing and, within limits,
self -determining .
"
1. Introduction to Philosophy, p. 339.
a
Epistemological warrant for this position
la to be found In Philip E. Wheelwright's article,
"The Category of Self -Transcendence as an Essential
1
Element In the Concept of Personality." Its primary
thesis Is that "Significant reality must be dependent
on consciousness in order to be significant, yet inde-
2
pendent of consciousness in order to be real." Thus,
things are known through "the connotatlve fringe of
3
an actual datum" rather than by substantial unity
with it. "The self becomes habituated to the fluctu-
ations of its boundaries and thus becomes cognizant of
3
a field of cognition not wholly identical with it."
Seen with perspective the theory differentiates men
from G-od in the Universal Consciousness Just as surely
as it differentiates persons from things in the proces-
ses by which they experience them. It is, consequent-
ly, of tremendous significance for theories of Reli-
gious Education, which think of men as free agents, yet
primarily dependent upon G-od for their being, and, in
a degree, responsible to Him for its value-conserving
use.
1. Proceedings of the International Congress
of Philosophy, 1926 , pp. T2l=T27~.
2. IbldTT P. 121.
3. Ibid., p. 127.
r
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But "the true "beginning of metaphy
Ethical
Perfectioniam
from
a Desire-Value
Viewpoint,
pllcit in idealistic philosophies
long before Lotze remarked it and
1
Sorley wrote a book to prove it.
slcs lies in ethics. 11 This was im-
If a value-respecting Spirit is Immanent in the uni-
verse the ought -to-be foreshadows the _is as surely as
the ^s shines through the ought -to-be. Obviously the
metaphysic of personalism has its "beginning" in an
ethic which does Justice to both individuality and u-
niversality, allowing the translation of subjective
desires into objective values without, at the same
time, excluding a sense of obligation which provides
the dynamic for this process. It accepts neither a
goods nor a duty norm for morality but rather tries to
respect the claims of both in a desire-value viewpoint
overlaid with a modified categorical imperative: One
must strive to deepen the life of desire so that it will
yield in its realizations progressively fuller values.
One is thus drawn rather than driven to morality. He
is truly good because, of himself, he wants to be, and
not because, under an outside compulsion, he feels, or
fancies he feels, that he ought to be,
1, Moral Values and the Idea of G-od.
r
The system becomes clearer if one combines
1
Dr. Brightman 1 s "Dialectic of Desire" with Prof.
2
Everett's "Table of Values" in such a way as to show
that the deeper desires freely discovered and indulg-
ed, yield increasingly higher values until the whole
life of desire flowers in the whole life of value
which is morality:
Religious
/
Char ...J.x acter
Aesthetic
I
Bodily Recreational
Intellectual
i x
,
Associatlonal
VALUES I
I
VALUES
Economic Economic
DESIRES
|
i
Pleasure
J i DESIRES
Obj ects of
PTeasure
Activity
|
Persons
Ideals
GOD
1. Lectures in "Philosophy of Religion," Boston
University School of Theology, 1920-1921.
2. Moral Values
, p. 182.

This should not be construed to mean that
one desire fathers only one value. The primary tropism
of that desire is toward that value, but there is in
the life of desire, as in the life of value, an inter
-
penetration, which drives one, dialectically or instru-
mentally, from one desire or value to others and which
gives all of them, seen synoptically rather than cross
-
sectionally, the organic coherence of a living reality.
This is more clearly indicated by a second chart •••••
The Field of Values:
DESIRES VALUES
Economic Values
Bodily
Recreational
Associational
Aesthetic
Intellectual .
Character
God _— ~1 ~T _ — ReliglOUS
The tangled field illustrates what Sorley
1
calls "the interdependence of values" and what Eve-
2
rett means when he says :
"An ethics of value, which has as
1. Moral Values and the Idea of God , p. 519 ff
.
2. Moral Values
, pp . l8l^IB3
.
Pleasure
_^ __
Objects of pleasure ^_rElTZ -T_-r_—
Activity^-^_-_^i r_^_ _ r~
___
Persons^_^ =r_~: SZ 1 _tTzn^~^ _
Ideals---- - r r"^ r-: -
.
rr
its aim the most complete welfare at-
tainable, cannot be separated from an e-
thics of desire, which finds its task in
the training and organization of the ap-
petitive elements, higher and lower, of
our nature.
"These are not, it is to be obser-
ved, separate and independent values;
rather are they the aspects under which
it is convenient, for purposes of evalu-
ation, to survey the unity of life.
We must recognize, for example, the
way in which, under the conditions of
modern life, all the higher values have
become dependent to a greater or less de-
gree upon economic values. * * * Simi-
larly it may be noted that if the bodily
life is not properly maintained, all the
other interests are insecure or even im-
possible of attainment.
"Our use of material things is at
once changed when touched by the spiri-
tual forces of sympathy, intelligence,
beauty, and religious aspiration.
Today all progressive religious
institutions recognize the interdepend-
ence of these interests and seek to
provide the other values as essential to
the integrity of the religious life."
All theories of ethics such as those ex-
pounded here, which are in any sense speculative,
are vacated by the new glandular psychologies, which
reduce responsibility to "hormonic" content and mo-
rality to the so-called "chemistry of personality."
The most audacious and capacious of them is Louis
Berman's The Personal Equation
,
published by the Cen-
tury Company in 1925. It insists that men are "gland
controlled marionettes." Desires are only secretions
t
and values accretions the feeble tickings of
"a piece of chemical clockwork," The blood, the
nerves, and the glands form "a triumvirate" of "ma-
chines whose integrated functioning is the soul."
In an article appearing in the Saturday
Review of Literature for December 12, 1925, Professor
Joseph Jastrow of Wisconsin University, reviews and
criticizes the whole theory. He holds that the
glands tell something but not everything about person-
ality and that frequently their account is not only
partial but distorted.
"To see the mental life sanely," he
concludes, "it is essential to see it
whole; and the exaggeration of one phase
of its conditioning is likely to obscure
even more than to illuminate. It inter-
feres with a correct chiariscuro which it
is the aim of a scientific view to estab-
lish. However, psychologists are suffici-
ently conservative to run little danger of
losing their souls in the process of saving
their glands."
All of which is another way of saying that
"the integrated functioning" of the glands is still
to be explained and that Dr. Berman 1 s data, as well
as those of other glandulartisans, carry no answer
forlhe final question: "Is personality a construct
from, or a cause of, glandular secretions?" As yet
the new psychologists have devised no technique which
9
can furnish a statistical, i. e. scientifically re-
spectable, solution for this problem. It will have to
be, it appears, harmonic as well as "hormonie," and
here there is need for synoptic speculation, as even
1
Berman has lately realized . It will lead, eventual-
ly, as Everett and Sorley show, to organic unities of
desires and values Inexplicable this side of God and
selves.
Thus one is driven from ethics to reli-
Theologlcal glon as surely as from metaphysics to
Synergism ethics and by this particular ethic to
a religion which allows human freedom
and achievement within the limits of Divine Immanence.
The problem thus becomes theological: faith vs.
works; Calvin vs. Arminius; passivism vs. synergism;
intuition (revivalism) vs. intellect (Religious Edu-
cation) •
This conflict is not confined to Christiani-
ty. One of its most vivid statements comes from the
Hindus through Professor George Foot Moore.
2
"The sharpest conflict," he writes
,
in an account of a schism in Vishnuism,
1. See Berman 1 s more recent book, The Religion
Called Behaviorism (New York, Boni and Liveright, 1927),
which commends G-estalt -Psychology and accepts its synop-
tic principle, p. 56.
2. History of Religions, Vol, I, p. 337.
•
"was over the doctrine of grace. The
principle that salvation is the gift of
G-od, attained neither by works nor know-
ledge, hut through faith and devotion to
G-od, raised among the Ramanujas the ques-
tions which have divided Christian theo-
logians: Is faith a free act of man or is
it infused "by G-od? Is God's grace alone
operative in salvation and man purely pas-
sive, or does man co-operate with G-od?
The southern school were the Augustinlans
or Calvinists of Vlsnuism, adherents, in
their own phrase, of 'the cat-hold theo-
ry,' namely that a man has no more part
in his own salvation than the helpless
kitten which its mother seizes by the nape
of the neck and lugs out of danger. The
northern branch were synergists ; theirs
was 'the monkey -doctrine * —- man is like
the baby -monkey, which, when its mother
takes it up to carry it to a place of
safety, hangs on with all the strength of
its little arms."
After the foregoing discussion it is inar-
tistically obvious to add that Religious Education is
theologically synergistic, adhering to "the monkey-
doctrine" of conversion as well as evolution; but
even in the latter it insists on an intelligent factor
which saves man from biological, as well as Presbyte-
rian, determinism.
In no field of thought is the present
Sociological conflict between biologism and psycho-
Euthenlcs loglsm more clearly defined than in
that of sociology. The two school
s,
the eugenists and the euthenists, are diametrically
t
opposed to each other and consequently clash at every
point of contact. The issue is momentous for Religi-
ous Education, inasmuch as it is made a necessity, un-
der the one formulation, and a superfluity, if not an
absurdity, under the other.
Eugenics holds that character is a matter
of breeding, Given parents of certain antecedents, a
child will develop equally certain attributes, pre-
dictable from the germ-plasmatic possibilities of his
forebears. In this connection the overworked Edwards
and Jukes families have been charted far beyond the
Scriptural "third and fourth generations," Lately
they have been catapulted into the limelight again by
Albert Edward Wiggam, whose New Decalogue of Science
and Fruit of the Family Tree continue to furnish jui-
cy, if un-Mosaic, pabulum for the popular mind, Mr.
Wiggam preaches a good sermon from a corrupted text:
"Increase and stultify."
Euthenics, as defined by Mrs. Ellen H,
1
Richards, who coined the term and gave it its vogue
in current sociology, is quite the opposite of "Wig-
gamy." "It deals," she says, "with race-improvement
through environment; eugenics deals with race-im-
provement through heredity." Dr. Athearn specifies
the use of "environment" in the process by defining
1. Euthenics
, p. 1.
4L
1
euthenics as "the science of a controlled (not a
controlling) environment." In this he is supported
by the new Webster's dictionary which makes the term
"the science having to do with the betterment of li-
ving conditions through conscious endeavor in order
to secure efficient human beings,"
The significance of such a "science" for
Religious Education is too patent to require further
elaboration here, especially since it is treated ful-
ly in Chapter III of this dissertation under the head
of "The Sociological Source of Religious Education,"
Although euthenics defines the goal of so-
ciology, "efficient human beings," it remains for pe-
dagogy to develop a practical means to that end.
For several decades now schoolmasterly
Pedagogical thought has revolved around a single
Motivation axis: "Learn to do by doing," Educa-
tion, it holds, is not a matter of know
ledge but of conduct. Ideas and ideals are Involved
only incidentally if at all. If one would know all
that the race has known he must do all that the race
has done. He must recapitulate its errors as well
as its triumphs, its every stage from protoplasm
1. Lectures on "Principles of Moral and Religi-
ous Education," Boston University School of Theology,
1921-1922,
2. See Pages 113-116.

to ectoplasm. He does not "think" or "purpose;" he
merely "behaves under impulse and, so, evolves.
In the more grave than "gay nineties," as
1
Dr. Athearn points out , the theory took a practice-
makes-perfect formulation. "But oddly enough," he
observes, "the inspectors of copy-books found that the
worst writing was at the bottom of the page." Much
writing did not make good writers. Repetition did
not guarantee efficiency. Eventually copies were made
movable so that the writer constantly copied the per-
fect copy. With such a system much writing made good
writers because to practice (behavior) had been added
criticism (consciousness).
Even so the practice-myth reappeared under
a more intellectually respectable name, the project-
method. It continues to flourish and to bear, as its
advocates say, sour grapes for those who cannot grasp
it. Stir up something, start something, project some-
thing, action's the thing, projects, projects, pro-
jects ..... never mind the "principles." Ideas are on-
ly the ghosts of behavior anyway; and ideals are as
vaporous and evanescent as the pallid "souls" who che-
rish them. On with the dance. There is no piper.
1. Lectures, Boston University, 1921-1922.

Here again the implications for Religious
Education are as patent as important. Practice with
out criticism, projects without principles, cannot
produce ideals, which, when realized, yield values.
This statement admittedly exaggerates the
evils of the project -method, rt has many decided ad
1
vantages . Emme and Stevick state them admirably :
"1.) The pupil throws himself enthu-
siastically into his study "because now that
he has made the project his own he wants to
make a good showing.
"2.) Because his will to accomplish is
enlisted, he supplies in generous measure
the interest and effort at the base of all
good learning and studies all matters of
Christian principle and practice that arise
in connection with the projects.
"3«) Individual research and study are
stimulated. Worth-while habits of study
and investigation develop.
"4.) One thing leads to another in
constructive study of this kind and can
be carried on and on until the whole
round of Christian principles and practice
have been covered."
At the same time they append an equally va
lid enumeration of its difficulties:
"1.) Lack of a systematic method of
study may put a pupil' s ideas all in a
jumble.
"2.) Where group study -projects are
undertaken, slackers may develop who rest
back and depend upon other members of the
class to do the work.
"3.) Resourceful teachers, skilled in
the use of this method, are too often lack-
ing at present."
1. Principles of Religious Education, p. 181.
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Even Soares, whose pragmatistic bias leads
1
him to say in one place
,
"It is not necessary that the children
should recognize that they are in an edu-
cational process, or even that they should
realize that they have learned anything.
It is enough if the process has been a ge-
nuine experience,"
adds in the same paragraph,
"There is no education unless the student
experiences meaning Yrtiich has some definite
relation to the educational aim ."
Again, having
cited examples of what he considers admirable educa-
2
tional projects
,
he cautions against an over-emphasis
on muscular rather than mental activity, insisting
that "a real intellectual interest is a life-situa-
tion;" the announcement of all such enterprises must
be made "in such a way as to secure from the pupil"
3
a "responsive purpose" , or what the literature of the
Williams Institute of Berkeley, California, appropri-
3
ately terms a "creative purpose" •
The drift of all this is palpably toward
what may be called a project -plus pedagogy, in which
the "plus" is, on one side, Athearn' s "criticism",
and, on the other, Soares 1 s "responsive" or "creative
1. Religious Education
, p. 103.
2. Ibid., pp. lib -119; 159-160.
3. Ibid., p. 160.
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purpose." Taken together they are not far from what
is known in educational literature as "motivation," a
process which Includes: 1.) Preparation for the pro-
ject in terms of the pupil's personal experience and
personal interests; 2.) Emphasis on a conscious pur-
pose, desire, or "motive," the realization of which
gives the project its value for knowledge and charac-
ter.
Such a pedagogy as this is not only educa-
1,
tionally sound, as numerous experiments have proved
,
but philosophically consistent with the metaphysical
and ethical presuppositions which this dissertation
considers valid for Religious Education,
Wherever there is a conflict
Psychological in the background of Religi-
Purposive Behaviorism . ous Education, as it has
been charted here, the issue,
properly seen, turns out to be between the biological
and psychological, mechanical and ideational, factors
in experience: between breeding and learning; be-
tween practice and criticism; between behavior and
1, The author's monograph, "The Poetry Trail,"
included in the appendix to this dissertation, is an
attempt at a project-plan for creating interest in po-
etry plus critical insight into the life and teaching
of Jesus as v/ell as the development of a "responsive,
creative purpose" to express its character-values in
the pupil's subsequent conduct.
%G
consciousness. This suggests that the basic conflict
is psychological and that the final battle must be
fought out in that field. Selectively surveyed, it
yields two trunk systems of which the various psycho-
logies are sprout3 or branches behaviorism and
psychological personalism or self -psychology. Each of
these must be discussed separately before a synthesis
of their antitheses can be attempted.
The most voluminous, and, for the most
Behaviorism part, luminous spokesman for behavior-
ism is John B. Watson, formerly profes-
sor of psychology and director of the Psychological
Laboratory at Johns Hopkins University. Starting with
1
selected ideas from the psychology of William James
and E. A. Singer 1 s theory of "mind as an observable
object," he has formulated a so-called "objective" psy-
chology. Through lectures and magazine articles, dis-
tinguished by both clarity and piquancy of style, he
has given his theories wide vogue even in critical cir-
cles. It may be objected that his behaviorism is exag-
gerated and, so, not normative for the whole movement.
At the same time it must be admitted that its very ex-
travagances make it the best touchstone by which to
1. Cf. "What is a Person," pp. 8-9.
I
appraise behaviorism 3ince they represent a commenda-
ble attempt to "follow through" to its logical impli-
cations and to state these without subterfuge or sub-
tlety.
"Behaviorism," according to Watson's defi-
1
nition of it , "is a natural science that takes the
whole field of human adjustments as its own. Its
closest scientific companion is physiology," As a de-
finition this is hardly so specific as Watson's more
personal "scientific companions" might wish. Possi-
bly his "language-habits" should be supplemented by a
little less "laryngeal," and more conscious, integra-
ting and discriminating such as may conceivably shed
a little more light on the concept. Thus, behavior-
ism is that psychological method which reduces consci-
ousness to the observable behavior by which the orga-
nism adjusts itself to its environment. It is, by its
own admission, prevailingly physiological, explaining
mental states by describing the physical acts which
manifest them.
Under such a microscope, or macroscope,
"personality" dissolves. It becomes, Watson contends
,
2
only "the outgrowth of the habits we form"
,
i. e. a
1. Behaviorism , Mew York, The People's Insti-
tute Publishing Co., 1924, p. 8.
2. Ibid., p. 211.

construct from experience rather than a discovered
datum in it, or a dynamic cause of it.
"I define personality," the quotation
concludes, "as the sum of activities that
can be discovered by actual observation
of behavior over a long enough time to
give reliable information. In other words
personality is but the end product of our
habit -systems. Our procedure in studying
personality is the making and plotting of
a cross-section of the activity stream."
1
Religion, another major concern of Religi-
ous Education, fares no better than "personality."
If one accepts the behavioristic revelation, religion
was conceived in fear and born in indolence. Watson'
description of the accouchement defies all paraphrase
2
"No one knows, he says
,
"just how
the idea of a soul or the supernatural
started. It probably had its origin in
the general laziness of mankind. Certain
individuals, who in primitive society de-
clined to work with their hands, to go out
hunting, to make flints, to dig for roots,
became keen observers of human nature.
"They found that the loud noise from
breaking limbs, thunder, and other sound-
producing phenomena, would throw the pri-
mitive individual from very birth into a
panicky state, causing him to stop the
chase, cry, hide, and the like and
that in this state it was easy to train,
or more scientifically, to condition him.
These lazy but good observers soon found
devices by means of which they could at
will throw individuals into this fearsome
attitude and thus control primitive human
behavior. * * * The 'medicine-men' of pri-
mitive times soon established an elabo-
1. Behaviorism
, p. 214.
2. idicl.
, pp. 1-2.
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rate control through signs, symbols, ritu-
als, formulae, and the like. Medicine-men
have always flourished. A good medicine-
man has the best of everything and, best of
all, he doesn't have to work. These indi-
viduals have been variously called medicine-
men, soothsayers, dream-interpreters, and
prophets. Skill in bringing about these
emotional conditionings of the people in-
creased rapidly; organization among medi-
cine-men took place and we began to have re-
ligions of one kind and another, and chur-
ches, temples, cathedrals and the like,
each presided over by a medicine -man, * * *
The individual who functions as a medicine-
man in the narrow family group is, of
course, always the father. In the larger
group G-od or Jehovah takes the place of the
family father. Thus even the modem child
from the beginning is confronted by the dic-
ta of medicine -men be they the father,
the soothsayer of the village, the God or
Jehovah."
With similar satire, or, unfortunately, se
riousness, Watson sets out to pulverize personal, as
well as historic, religion. It is, he insists, no-
thing more mysterious or mystical than going through
certain mechanical motions, all of which can be easi
ly observed, measured, and charted. He illustrates,
1
hypothetically :
"In talking about the personality of an
individual we often hear the phrase, f He
is a deeply religious man.' What does that
mean? It means that the individual goes to
church on Sunday, that he reads the Bible
daily, that he says grace at the table,
that he sees to it that his wife and chil-
dren go with him to church, and that he
1. Behaviorism
, pp. 213-214.
ii
tries to convert his neighbor into beco-
ming a religious man and that he engages
in many hundreds of other activities all
of which are called parts of a modern
Christian's religion. Let us put all of
these separate activities together and
call them the religious habit system of
the individual. * * * Again, it is far
too complex a task for us to attempt to
take each of the strands of this religi-
ous organization and to trace out its be-
ginning and its genetic history."
Thus, "the re-
ligious man," conceived of as the author and arbiter
of his own actions becomes only an automaton, behaving
or misbehaving under the stimulus of forces so "natu-
ral" as to require no definition in terms other than
those of the physical sciences. But for all of this
there is some hope, since, under the redeeming impetus
of the behavioristlc enlightenment religion is "being
1
replaced among the educated by experimental ethics."
Just how much morality this will salvage
from the wreck of religion is made a matter of conjec-
2
ture by Watson's admission that "the behaviorist is
naturally not interested in his (an hypothete's) mo-
rals, in fact he doesn't care what kind of a man he
is," supplemented by his avowed skepticism of the va-
lidity of any "standardized" or idealized morality:
3
"I doubt very seriously," he writes ,"that
1. Behaviorism
, p. 13.
2. Ibid., p. 212.
3. Ibid., p. 229.

any man or woman is Invulnerable on any
commandment, on any code of honesty, on
any lifelong settled conviction, I think
the time was when invulnerability was a
more nearly possible thing. Today conven-
tions are so universally overstepped, re-
ligious mandates so often transgressed,
business honesty and integrity so often a
matter of legal decision, that all of us
are vulnerable if and when approached long
enough and hard enough and subtly enough
on our weak side. This does not mean that
you or I would rob a bank tonight, commit
murder or rape, take undue advantage of
our neighbor; yet almost Invariably we do
many so-called unethical things, given cer-
tain conditions."
That is to say, morality is, in the last analysis, a
purely relative matter and it is relative not to the
person but to the conditions that control him. Man
is the victim of his environment; he has no soul. Sti
muli from without determine all his reactions. He has
no subjective nature to be revealed by introspection
or directed by ideas. "Instincts" are conditioned be-
havior; ideals are fictions, the ghosts of a type of
behavior, which, if alive, might yield values.
Nevertheless behaviorism is to be vigorous-
ly commended because: 1.) It attempts to simplify psy-
chology; 2.) It deals with more definite data than
"functions" and so can rightly claim superior positive-
ness; 3.) It avoids the fictions, "faculties" and "ima
ginative representations" of exploded "mental contents"
psychologies; it is Just as surely to be condemned,
i
however, because: 1.) It asks too frequently only
what happens and too rarely how does it happen and
why; 2.) It reduces thinking to the attempt of the
organism biologically to adjust itself to its envi-
ronment and consciousness to a mere succession of me-
chanical reactions behind which are no purposes and
beyond which are no values; 3») It rests on the em-
plriclstic or sensationalistic point of view which de-
mands sensible data as the only valid materials of
knowledge and holds that an explanation of their ori-
gin explains them; 4.) It assumes that experience is
disjointed units of stimulus -and-reaction rather than
coherent wholes of situation-and-response, "Gestalten"
or "conf igurations, " as Koffka calls them in his ar-
resting and tremendously significant book, The Growth
1
of the Mind.
Like behaviorism, self -psychology
Self -Psychology or psychological personalism, has an
outstanding and outspoken champion,
Mary W. Calkins, who, until her recent retirement, was
head of the Psychology and Philosophy department in
Wellesley College. There is a new immanent and dyna-
mic self in psychology and Miss Calkins is its pro-
2
phetess.
1. Cf. "What is a Person," p. 17.
2. Cf. "What is a Person," p. 6.

Miss Calkins' s most specific definition of
self -psychology is in the preface to the fourth re-
vised edition of her First Book in Psychology, where
1
she says
,
"Psychology is most naturally, consist-
ently, and effectively treated as a stu-
dy of conscious selves in relation to o-
ther selves and external objects ••••• in
a word, to their environment personal and
impersonal.
"
She confirms this position in an
2
article in the Journal of Philosophy , which asserts
that "psychology must simply accept selves on their
face -value as observed facts;" and again, in The
3
Personallst
,
where she quotes William McDougall as
an exponent of her position: "All experiencing or
thinking is the experiencing or thinking of someone,"
These threads of theory, tied up with others borrowed
from Coe, Koffka, and Brightman, may be logically wo-
ven into a more comprehensive definition of self-
psychology, which makes it that theory of the nature
of mind which holds that observable mental life can
be fully explained only by finding in it an lntrospec
tive datum, the operation of consciousness , i.e. the
activity of a person or self, which: 1.) Creates and
1. Page vil.
2. Vol. XX (1923), No. 1, p. 10.
3. Vol. 5 (1924), No. 1, p. 6.

associates ideas; 2.) Is the integrating principle
of the complex from which these ideas spring and in
which they are realized; 3.) Expresses preferential
functions and performs them; 4.) Operates in all of
these activities without being exhausted by them, an
immanent spirit, at once subjective and objective, a
coherent fragment of the organic whole of reality, ca-
pable of appreciating, carrying, and conserving va-
lues.
Manifestly such a psychology as this places
the highest evaluation on personality; is congenial
1
to religion, as is shown in "YThat is a Person" ; and
makes morality, the translation of desires into values,
the major method for achieving the highest reality,
personality. This reverence for religion, in strik-
ing contrast with Watson's flippant cynicism, at
times approaching blasphemy, is vividly apparent to
2
anyone who reads the chapters in Miss Calkins' s book
dealing with "Faith and Belief as Related to Will,"
"Faith and Will as Social Attitudes," and "The Religi-
ous Attitude."
In criticism of self -psychology , it must be
admitted that Miss Calkins' s method lays her liable
1. See especially pp. 18-20.
2. XIII, XIV, XV.

to the frequently-voiced and over-advertised objection
that she begins with "unprovable assumptions," the ex-
istence of selves and one's Immediate experience of it.
This is true. It may be said, however, in defense of
Miss Calkins, that her subsequent arguments, supported
by experimental data, provide scientific warrant for
such axiomatic , rather than dogmatic, assumptions. E-
ven so McDougall, Coe and Koffka make progress over
Miss Calkins by starting with behavior, stripped of
all self-ly trappings, and finding in it, eventually,
the operation of a self, which is, under such proce-
dure, an inescapable datum , rather than an "arbitra-
ry assumption."
All of this suggests that a sound psycholo-
gy, even as a sound pedagogy in which a valid system
of Religious Education can be grounded, will be syn-
thetic. As in the other instance, it may be called
Behaviorism-plus ••••• plus purposes, which, when re-
alized, give it values and coherence. Even Miss Cal-
kins concedes that self-psychology agrees with beha-
viorism in its insistence that psychology should not
be a study of "concepts, percepts, or emotions, 'ly-
1
ing around loose in the world 1 ." Self -psychology in-
1. The Personalist, V, 1, p. 6.

eludes and concludes behaviorism. It is, then, not
inappropriately allowed to synthesize the reconcila-
ble antitheses between itself and behaviorism under
1
the new designation, Purposive Behaviorism •
This clears the way for a fi-
Definltlon nal definition of Religious
of
Religious Education Education. Critical as well
as popular misconceptions of
it have been dissipated. Valid and consistent pre-
suppositions for it have been established. Against
such a background its true meaning emerges unmistaka-
bly. Religious Education is the application of sound
psychological, pedagogical, sociological, ethical,
metaphysical, and theological principles to the pro-
duction of moral character; the conversion of de-
sires into values or the process by which desires are
so deepened as to yield progressively higher values;
the introduction of God into experience in such a way
as to develop ideals, value-yielding behavior •••••
moral persons.
!• Cf . foot-note on Bower, p. 160 ff
i
"The palm will be won by him
who is fortunate enough to trace
the formative forces of the animal
-
body to the universal or life-tend-
ing forces of the universe."
Carl Ernst von Baer.
4
CHAPTER II
The BIOLOGICAL SOURCE of RELIGIOUS
EDUCATION: PSYCHOTROPIC EVOLUTION
In Chapter I Soares was praised for ground-
ing Religious Education in "biology. Similarly Miss
Calkins was criticized for beginning with specula-
tive rather than evidential data. Both observations
imply a relation between science and Religious Educa-
tion which this dissertation attempts to make expli-
cit. It will show that the principles on which
Church School programs are built are drawn from cer-
tain exact sciences biology, sociology, and psy-
chology and that its objectives are, consequent-
ly, more than pious vaporings masquerading as pedago-
gy.
According to reports emanating from the Va-
tican, the first two topics on the "Agenda" for the
Ecumenical Council of 1930 are "Evolution" and "Reli-
gious Education." The Holy See has divined the con-
nection between the two and has considered it signifi-
cant enough to be a subject for _ex cathedra apprai-
sals. The trend which its pronouncement will take
is a matter of mystery the present pontiff is both
learned and liberal but its primacy in the pro-
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ceedlngs of so august an assembly will make It, un-
questionably, the focus of religious attention for
the next five years. What is evolution? How valid
is the evidence for it? What are its implications
for theology as well as biology? Are its values spe-
cious or real and can they be used to stimulate faith
or create character? These are some of the questions
that may conceivably be submitted to the first Ecume-
nical Council since 1870; they are also matters of
primary significance for the argument of this disser-
tation.
In defining evolution, one can scare e-
Definitlon ly improve upon Herbert Spencer's formu-
Evolution lation
,
translated Just enough to reveal
its philosophical significance: "Evo-
lution is a change from Indefinite (chaotic), incohe-
rent (meaningless) homogeneity to definite (intelli-
gible), coherent (organized) heterogeneity by a pro-
cess of continuous integrations (breakings off) and
differentiations (individualizations) . " Huxley made
2
the idea clearer by adding : " ••••• that is, a gene-
ral name for the history of the steps by which any
living being has acquired the morphological and physi-
1. Data of Ethics
, p. 65.
2. Enc. Brit., 9th edition. Cf. Darwlnlana
, Chap.
VI, "Evolution in Biology," pp. 186-226^
<
ological characters which distinguish it."
Here, as often, it is not the major
Implications motif but the overtones that cause the
controversy. The implications of the
evolutionary theory are even more disturbing than its
basic thesis, notably:
1.) Biologically interpreted, it discounts
the worth of man by giving him an undeniably anima-
listic origin:
This tendency is apparent in the Grimm bro-
thers' attempt to discredit the so-called divine ori-
gin of language by showing that it evolved from the
grunts of animals. Dr. Athearn points out the funda-
1
mental fallacy here when he says characteristically:
"There is a relation between the
sound of things and the thing said; you
cannot say 'love' without smiling or
, hate l without frowning. The baby lets
his mouth fly open and the wind fly
through and the delighted father says:
'He is calling me.' The fact of the mat-
ter is that the process is not so mecha-
nical as it seems; there is intelligence
there; the baby discovers that certain
grunts bring certain responses and uses
those grunts when he wants those respon-
ses. Eventually the grunts are refined
into words and language, this, too, under
the operation of intelligence.
"
1. Lectures on "Principles of Moral and Religi-
ous Education," Boston University School of Theology,
1921-1922.
I
2. ) This suggests the Freudian conclusions
that body controls mind and that sex is the source of
soul:
Thoroughly formulated this turns out to "be
instinctivism. It is partially true and so doubly
dangerous. Too frequently it gives rise to such va-
garies as Scribner Ames's contention that life, in
its last analysis is to be referred to two instincts:
hunger, which preserves the individual; and sex,
which preserves the species. The first creates agri-
culture, architecture, manufacturing; the second,
the family, marriage, city government, national go-
vernment, religion. Thus, as Dr. Athearn comments,
"the love of G-od becomes only a slight refinement of
the love of mates and religion a sort of super-marri-
age." It is admittedly a reductio ad absurdum, but
one which reveals unmistakably the trend of an over-
biologized, over -Freudian! zed evolution.
3. ) Under a preformation interpretation,
evolution seems to exclude novelty and, so, to sub-
stitute cyclic recurrence or even metempsychosis for
creativity:
This, too, has religious implications, as
ci
1
John Galsworthy realized when he wrote :
"I not only disbelieve utterly, but in-
tensely dislike, the doctrine of metempsy-
chosis, which, if I understand it aright,
seems the negation of the creative im-
pulse, an apotheosis of staleness no-
thing quite new in the world, never any-
thing quite new even the soul of a ba-
by."
4.) Admitting creation, the theory seems
certainly to deny creation by a single act such as
is recorded in the Scriptural record of the origin of
man:
It is this that projects the controversy
into the realm of religion and gives rise to the ar-
guments and animosities of the Fundamentalist -Modern-
ist debate.
5») Thus interpreted, evolution challenges
the verbal infallibility of the Bible, and is, accor-
dingly, for llteralists, mechanistic and atheistic in
its general trend "anathema"
:
This is half true. The evolutionary theo-
ry is incompatible with a literal interpretation of
the Scriptures, but it is not on that account mecha-
1. Foreword to W. H, Hudson's Green Mansions
(Alfred Knopf, Borzoi Pocket Edition)
, p. x.
(4
nistic and atheistic. Liberal religionists as well
as scientists take issue with Fundamentalists here.
Their argument against the literal interpretation of
the Bible may be reduced to three main objections:
a.) It is unscientific because it blinks incontrover-
tible facts and eventuates in irreconcilable contra-
dictions; b.) It is unphilosophical in that it ex-
plains the whole in terms of the part rather than,
vice-versa, the parts in terms of the whole; c.) It
is Christianly untheological because Inconsistent
with the teachings of Jesus, which persistently and
consistently elevate the spirit above the letter of
the Law and reveal truth in parables to be interpret-
ed synoptically rather than allegorically , much less
verbally.
But whatever the implications of the
Demonstration theory are and however divided opini-
ons about their truth may be, the fac-
tual evidence for the central thesis the emergence
of higher from lower forms of life by gradual proces -
ses is rather conclusive. It includes, compre-
hensively enough: 1.) The pal eontological proof,
sometimes called more graphically, "the record of the
rocks," which demonstrates the progressive develop-
Cf. Bather, Francis A., Creation by Evolution,
pp. 102-111.
(i
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ment of forms of life from the geological strata in
which fossil remains of higher or lower animals are
1
invariably found . 2.) Biological proof or "the con-
firmation of the flesh" The embryo in its pre-na-
tal development recapitulates the stages in evolution
from protoplasm to ectoplasm. Drummond holds that in
paleontology and biology alone evolution has been vir-
tually demonstrated and "has done for time what astro-
nomy has done for space." 3.) Axiological proof or
"the witness of the intellect" The theory has a-
mazing value in establishing and maintaining the co-
herence of the universe, and, having value, carries
a high presumption of validity. This is the point
2
that Newman makes when he says :
"Necessity compels the evolutionist to ad-
mit that there is no absolute proof of or-
ganic evolution. But for that matter there
is no absolute proof of anything that de-
pends on records of past events. The na-
ture and proof of organic evolution is this
that, using the concept of organic evo-
lution as a working hypothesis, it has been
possible to rationalize and render intelli-
gible a vast array of observed phenomena,
the real facts upon which evolution rests."
1. For a striking discussion as well as chart
of this argument see Thomson's Outline of Science
,
Vol. I, pp. 88-93,
2. Evolution and its Modern Relation to Gene -
tics and Eugenics , p. 3.
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In his Moral Values and the Idea of God
The Sorley gives a formula for the investi-
Problematic
Method gation of individuals, say an individu-
al problem such as one faces in arriv-
ing at a coherent theory with regard to so complex a
concept as evolution.
"In studying the individual," he urges,
"any individual, we begin with a first ap-
prehension of it as a whole; next we pro-
ceed to discriminate the different elements
or factors of the object (and here is the
region of analysis) : then, with a clearer
knowledge of each factor, we attempt a syn-
thesis; and finally we seek once more to
see the object as a whole to grasp its
unity again but with fuller information a-
bout its diverse features."
In the case of evolution the intuitional
Analysis synopsis has been made and analysis is now
in order. It reveals three fundamental
principles in the Darwinian formulation of evolution:
1.) The Origin of Species:
Just as astronomical evolution starts with
a nebula and produces the solar system or as geologi-
cal evolution starts with a molten fragment and pro-
duces the world, so biological evolution starts with
the amoeba and produces man. "Under the preformation
2
theory," says Dr. Athearn , "life is simply the expan-
1, Page 506.
2. Lectures, Boston University, 1921-1922.
c
sion of characters and parts always present but too
small at first to "be visible. In this sense the full-
grown organism is supposed to be implicit in the cell
from which it originated." This makes consciousness
little more than "the blush on the face of protoplasm"
and man a mechanism, or at best an organism, whose ac-
tions are predetermined by preformed factors.
2.) The Law of Natural Selection:
The secret of the mechanical method by
which man evolved from the amoeba is to be found in
the law of natural selection. Living, according to
the thorough-going Darwinian or Spencerian, can be
reduced to "a struggle for life" involving two fun-
damental processes, nutrition and reproduction. Na-
ture is prodigal of her creatures: the vast majority
of them die without producing offspring. The result-
ant competition for food and "a chance to live" pro-
duces variations which increase or decrease the orga-
nism's ability to adjust itself to its environment;
hence the different "species," some of which seem, by
sheerest accident, to have been "selected by nature"
(a biological Presbyterianism) as winners in the cos-
mic conflict of cell against cell.

3.) The Survival of the Fittest:
The end of all this striving is "the sur-
vival of the fittest." Conn states the theory most
1
succinctly, when he writes :
"If there are among the hundreds of indi-
viduals some that are less adapted to con-
ditions than others, these will be the ones
to yield in the struggle and die without
producing offspring. If, on the other hand,
there he among the variations some which
render the possessors "better adapted to
their conditions, these animals will be the
ones to survive the struggle and produce
offspring."
It is all very simple: those that
were best fitted to survive, survive; those that
were not disappear forever except as the fossil re-
mains of forgotten episodes in the life of a cosmic
"Playboy," Nature. The latter is more fully and ar-
tistically treated in Jack London's story, "When G-od
2
Laughs" . It ends with the ironic observation: "No
body wins; they just think they do."
A synthesis such as Sorley prescribes
Synthesis after an analysis like this reveals cer-
tain inescapable implications not of evo
lution but of a strictly Darwinian or biological in-
terpretation of it:
1« The Method of Evolution
, p. 23.
2. When God Laughs, Berlin and Leipzig, Tauch-
nltz, 1912, pp. 1-29.
(
1. ) Man is a "biological accident rather
than the culmination of a cosmological plan:
Clearly the origin of species, working
through the law of natural selection for the survival
of the fittest, makes man a biological sport rather
than the realization of a purposive plan. In the
preformational lexicon of life there is no such word
as "will" or "mind" or "intelligence." Things hap-
pen "because they have to and not "because anyone wills
or thinks them. Man happened in much the same way
••••• a capricious emergence from a mechanical pro-
cess in no way concerned about the values which huma-
nity represents.
2. ) All of his actions are controlled by
necessity:
Under a biological interpretation of the
origin of species man lives in a world of topsy-turvy
adjustments. His actions are determined by an outward
necessity rather than an inward choice. He doesn't
1
think; he only behaves. "Hunger," Ames insists
,
"keeps the individual alive; sex, the species." No-
thing is operative in the life of man that was not o-
perative in the lives of his chimpanzaic forebears and
1. The Psychology of Religious Experience , (Boston.
Houghton
-Mifflin, 1910) pp.
<
implicit in the microscopic wiggles of the protozon.
There is nothing new under the sun or in the son: he
is only the expansion of his father, a mechanistic
puppet, reacting when the strings of nutrition or re-
production are pulled by the master of the show, im-
1
personal, partial Nature •
3.) He has no self or soul:
Being a mere mechanism such as he is made
under the law of natural selection, man has no deter-
mining, much less enduring, spirit, "Organisms and
their operations," the behavioristic biologist ex-
ults, "exhaust the whole of life and leave no room for
G-od and ghosts." Thinking is a fiction or, in so-call-
ed "dynamic" psychology, a spin on one's sensory-mo-
tor-cycle. Consciousness is only "structure" or, at
2
best, "function," and, at worst, "a pure diaphaneity;
1. Cf . Omar Khayyam, Rubaiyat, lxviii and lxix:
"We are no other than a moving row
Of Magic Shadow-shapes that come and go
Round with the Sun-illumined Lantern held
In Midnight by the Master of the Show,
"But helpless Pieces of the Game He plays
Upon this Chequer-board of Nights and Days;
Hither and thither moves, and checks and slays,
And one by one back in the Closet lays,"
2. William James, Essays in Radical Empiricism
,
p. 2.
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those who cling to it are clinging to a mere echo, the
faint rumor left "behind by the disappearing soul on the
air of philosophy."
In the light of these implications it is
hardly to "be wondered at that G-eorge Bernard Shaw, erst-
while cynic par excellence , has suggested recently
that we "try Christianity" as an antidote for Darwini-
1
an evolution and has protested even more violently a-
gainst the materialistic Moloch on which "man has "been
sacrificed to the idolatrous conceits of a scientific
theory .
"
"Where, there was once a G-od, " he laments,
"a cause, a faith that the universe was or-
dered, however inexplicable by us its order
might be, and therefore a sense of moral re-
sponsibility that was part of that order,
there is now an utter void. Chaos has come
again.
"
It remains for philosophical synopsis, the
Synopsis fourth process in Sorley's problematic me-
thod to bring order out of this "chaos," re-
store the mind and 3ave the soul. This it does by
pointing out the Inherent weaknesses in the Darwinian
and Spencerian systems and proposing as a substitute
for, or, better, perhaps, a supplement to, strictly bi-
ological evolution, what may be called psychological or
1. Back to Methuselah.
( *
(
psychotropic evolution. This holds that mind, as well
as matter, has evolved, has grown (hence psychotropic),
and that in the process there have at times entered
new elements, neither present nor implicit in the pre-
ceding stages, which have established new organizing
centers and have made the organism not only what it
was but also what it has become as the result of the
interaction of the new elements and the old environ-
ment,
1
"Mental evolution," Coe insists , "is no
mere extension of biological functions but
also the emergence of fresh functions,"
In Dr. Athearn 1 s words, "Man is a machine plus consci -
ousness ."
The facts forcing the recognition of consci-
ousness as a determining element in the evolutionary
process and the appropriate modifications of the bio-
logical interpretation of evolution necessitated by
such a discovery of obviously psychological factors
are:
1. ) The explanation of "origin":
The theory of the origin of species states
the fact of origin without explaining it. It sets
1, The Psychology of Religion, p. 25.
a
forth the "whence" and "whither" of evolution but
1
begs the "why." "Laws," says Pratt , "are only de-
scriptions of the way in which things act." They are
at best modal and never causal. Moreover their very
inflexibility precludes progress. This is Hobhouse's
contention, when, after an argument as cogently stated
2
as it is profoundly reasoned, he concludes :
"Evolution, biologically considered, exhi-
bits no comprehensive plan or pervading
tendency. It produces, not necessarily a
higher type, but one that deals more effec-
tually with its particular environment.
It may be said, perhaps, to tend towards
variation, but the variation is not neces-
sarily towards anything higher or better.
The development of Mind in animals and Man
means, in our view, the gradual introduc-
tion of a higher principle of organization
into this relatively chaotic state."
This re-
veals the outstanding gaps in the Darwinian formula-
tion of evolution "the great gulf fixed" be-
tween chaotic, inanimate motion, and ordered life,
and, after that, on higher levels, the equally yawn-
ing abyss between animals and man. Both can be
bridged by the same entity, consciousness, "Mind,"
intelligence.
3
"The biological school," says Dr. Athearn
,
"makes thoughts the mere dots and dashes
of mental telegraphy; the psychological
1. The Religious Consciousness
, p. 25.
2. Mind in Evolution (London, Macmillan, 1915),
P. 437.
3. Lectures, Boston University, 1921-1922.
(s
I
( I
school makes them expressions of the mind
of the operator; it thus distinguishes
between an animal organism, instinctively
reaching out for food and a human being,
thinking for himself and allowing his
thoughts to modify his behavior,
1
Polakov adds that
"the fundamental difference between man
and the animal is that man works to live
while the animal lives to work. Men,
unlike animals, have the ability to get
work done. They are able to create sci-
ences, art, religion, and civilization,
which the animal is not. Animals work
today as they did thousands of years ago,
but the change in the mode of living of
men is immense. The power that causes
that change is the power of passing dis-
coveries into the future the time-
binding power of men."
All of these observations are only other
ways of saying that there is something missing in
"the origin of species" and that that "something" is
consciousness intelligence.. Between the lowest
animal and the highest there is only a hair 1 s-
breadth 1 s difference; but between the highest animal
and the lowest man there is an impassable gulf which
neither "structure" nor "function," "behavior," nor
"instinct" can span. There is a probability that they
have had somewhere a common ancestor but little like-
lihood that they belong to the same species.
1. Lecture, Ford Hall Forum, October, 1925
((
I
Differently stated, the question is this:
Is mind a constructive factor in evolution or a fortu-
itous accretion? Does it cause modified adaptations
or is it a consequence of them?
The following definitions, summarized from
the philosophies of the men Indicated, show the histo-
ry of the concept of "mind" or "consciousness" from
its emergence in Plato and Aristotle to its evanes-
cence in Singer and John B. Watson:
Plato Consciousness is the apprehension
of abstract thoughts or universals.
Aristotle Consciousness is the appre-
hension of concrete things or particulars,
Descartes (1596-165°) Consciousness is
1
the possession of innate thoughts of things •
Hume (1711-1776) Consciousness is the
association of sensations or percepts.
Kant (1724-1804) Consciousness is the
process by which sensations of things are made over
into thoughts of things.
Herbart (1776-1841) Consciousness is the
process by which new things are apprehended through re
lation to old thoughts of things apperception.
1. Cf . Weber, History of Philosophy, which, in
characterizing DescartesTs doctrine of consciousness,
calls it "self -acquired knowledge" (page 308); an "in-
nate idea," (page 310); something "implanted," (page
t
James (1842-1910) Consciousness is the
process by which thoughts and things are so related as
to "work" ••••• function.
Modern instrumentalism Consciousness
1
is a "biological instrument of behavior •
Modern Personal! sm Consciousness is an
awareness of existence in relations ("configurations"),
a process by which things become coherent thoughts of
things, or, conversely, coherent thoughts of things
become things ••••• concrete universals.
2.) The law of rational choice:
Such a consciousness as this, human on the
higher, and divine on the lower, levels of evolution,
repeals, or at least limits the application of, the law
of natural selection. Even Darwin admitted that he
had at first over-rated the efficiency of the principle
and that other agencies had been concerned to a great-
er extent than he had at first been inclined to be-
2
lieve. But, as Conn shows
, "the real question is not
the efficiency but the sufficiency of the law." It is
not sufficient. It must be supplemented by the law of
rational choice before it can begin to explain even the
phenomenal order of life. "Consciousness," says Dr.
1. Cf . Leighton, The Field of Philosophy, pp.
344-349.
2. The Method of Evolution, p. 44.

1
Athearn
,
is a cause of events in the world not a
construct or resultant of biological action." Func-
tions are not only instinctive but intelligent . ....
2
preferential
,
necessitating choice on a basis of rea
son, insight into causes and foresight into consequen
ces.
3.) The arrival of the fittest:
With the repeal of the law of natural se-
lection, or at least a limitation of its jurisdiction
comes the collapse of the third concept of Darwinian
evolution, "the survival of the fittest." If intel-
ligence, rather than merely mechanical "Nature" func-
tions in life, man's survival does not depend upon
his ability to make biological adjustments alone, but
also on his ability to make intelligent conquests.
Thus the problem is shifted from the survival of the
fittest to the arrival of the fittest, for which the
most valid solution is consciousness, a unique ele-
ment in the evolutionary process establishing new re-
organizing centers and making man share in the divine
activity which creates and conserves the values com-
prising the universe.
1. Lectures, Boston University, 1921-1922.
2. Gf. "What is a Person?", p. 15.
t•
Thus life becomes more than a conflict be-
tween cells, a co-operation between selves. Cells
are impressed with ideas that grow into selves. This
makes consciousness both the impress er and the im-
pressed, something that may live after the dust is
dead. The self does not die with the departing
breath. "I am; also I have a body." The cell may
crumble; but the self consciousness, mind, per-
son losing one mode of expression to gain another,
grows, evolves, progresses. There is no resting place
this side of God and immortality.
These modifications of the biological inter-
pretation of evolution imply that mind evolves with
matter and has since the universe began. Intelligence
has been the dynamic factor in evolution and will be
until it reaches its goal. "Before the world was I
am." The Spirit that moved on the face of the waters
has been, from pre-creation forward, immanent in the
process as a causative -purposive, effective-enriching
factor, making the evolving universe a realm of ends,
1
a reservoir of values, "a vale of soul-making"
.
With the data of evolution thus descri-
Cone lusions bed, sifted, and evaluated, certain con-
clusions with regard to it are inescapa-
ble, principally:
1. John Keats.

A. The evidence for the central thesis of the
theory is so overwhelming as to force its acceptance.
B. Admitting the fact of evolution, one is for-
ced to choose from its various interpretations the one
which most fully explains all the factors Involved:
Of these the strictly biological interpre-
tation is unsatisfactory, because: a.) It makes evo-
1
lution a misnomer It purports to present life as a
process unfolding from the center outward. As a matter
of fact it reduces living to a mere inrolling from the
periphery inward. Its trend is toward contraction ra-
ther than expansion and its end the Indefinite rather
than the Infinite. It can have validity only for
minds that no longer feel the lure of "blue horizons
2
far away" . b.) Its gap-fillers are scientifically
and philosophically inadequate Under an exclusive-
ly Darwinian or Spencerlan formulation, there is more
than one "missing link," as even ardent evolutionists
admit.
3
"For," as Pratt points out , one can ne-
1. Cf. Hobhouse, Mind in Evolution
, p. 436:
"Evolution by natural selection is the direct negation
of an organic growth. It is in no way parallel to the
regular unfolding of a germ. It is an irregular back-
wards and forwards movement in which now an individual
of one type prevails, now an example of another, and
little by little the battle swings over to one side.
This is not development,"
2. C. H. Sorley, Marlborough and Other Poems
, p.
80
.
3. The Religious Consciousness
, p. 28.

ver prove that an Inexperienced hypothe-
tical entity is the only solution of a gi-
ven problem that no other guess is pos-
sible. Hence when a scientist proposes
any such unverified entity as a gap-filler,
he is simply inventing aids to the imagi-
nation and the memory or he is writing me-
taphysics. It may be perfectly good meta-
physics, but it is metaphysics not science."
That is to say, science eventually comes to metaphy-
sics, when it moves from the standpoint of existences
to the standpoint of values, as it must if it is to
1
find essential causality. As Aristotle demonstrated
,
the mind refuses to rest this side of final causes.
In the matter of evolution the strict biologist stops
with formal, material, and efficient causes; the psy-
chologist and metaphysician go on to final causes,
c.) It is at best modal and not causal and, so, as
2
Conn insists
,
efficient but not sufficient, descrip-
tive rather than explanatory.
Accordingly, the strictly biological inter-
pretation must be supplemented by a psychological in-
terpretation such as will: a,) Refer progress to con-
scious interests as well as biological Instincts; b.)
Recognize intelligent factors in the process, coming
to a focus on higher levels in immanent selves or per-
sons; c.) Find some sort of Mind, Spirit, or G-od in
1. Metaphysics
,
1073a24-1074a25 (Serlbner' s edi-
tion, New York, 1927), pp. 56 -59.
2. The Method of Evolution
, p. 44.
#
the machine, responsible for this original and endu-
ring dynamic.
C. The history of the ideas involved in the evo-
lutionary theory seems to warrant such a personaliza-
tion or splritualization of its processes, since it
shows that thought about its principles has had a ten«
dency to come to rest in a position which refers pro-
gress in the universe to psychological as well as bi-
ological factors:
1.) Ancient:
BIOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGICAL
ANAXIMANDSR, 570 B.C.
There is spirit in matter,
life-in-the-wood (hylozo-
ism; reality is the trans-
formation of indestructible
substance.
|
HERACLITUS, 540-480 B.C.
"Strife is the father of all
things finite. Struggle is
an inexpugnable feature of
reality." "Two opposing
principles, harmony and strife
account for the mutations of
things."
EMPEDOCLES, 495-435 B.C.
The strife which
gives rise to reality is
a conflict between love
(attraction) and hate
(repulsion)
•

BIOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGICAL
DEMOCRITUS, 460-360 B.C.
"All things rise from
the impact and rebound of
atoms. There is simply
everlasting motion of
mass -particles in space.
The soul itself consists
of the finest motion of
the finest particles."
ARISTOTLE, 384-322, B.C.
"To Aristotle the whole of
nature is instinct towards
some higher manifestation.
Organic life presents it-
self to him as a progressive
scale of complexity deter-
mined by its final end, name
ly man." Enc. Brit., X,
p. 24-a.
LUCRETIUS, 99-55 B.C.
— "In his fifth book he
traces the progressive
generations of vegetal
and animal forms out of
The STOICS, 336-110 B.C.
"All things develop
out of an original be-
ing, which is at once
material (fire) and spi-
ritual (Deity). The
world as a developed
whole is an organism
which is permeated with
the divine spirit; and
so we may say that the
world-process is a Self-
Realization of the Di-
vine Being." Enc.
Brit., X, p. 24-a.

BIOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGICAL
LUCRETIUS (Continued)
the mother earth," "He
also touches on the de-
velopment of man out of
a hardy beast -like con-
dition. Pertinent hints
are given respecting a
natural development of
language which has its
germs in sounds of quad-
rupeds and birds, of re-
ligious ideas out of
dreams and waking hal-
lucinations and of the
art of music by help of
the suggestion of natu-
ral sounds." Enc
.
Brit., X, p. 24.
PLOTINUS, 204-270 A.D.
Plotinus charted the
ascent of the soul through
the stages from the gross-
ly material to the pure-
ly spiritual.
2.) Modem:
BIOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGICAL
KANT, 1724- 1804 Kant
saw life as movement from
chaos to cosmos to micro-
cosmos, a refining process
with individuality, per-
sonality as its objective.
He recognized "creation"
as the beginning of the
phenomenal order.

BIOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGICAL
SCHELLING-, 1775-1854-
"Nature and mind are
each viewed as an acti-
vity advancing by an un-
interrupted succession
of stages," "The evolu-
tion of mind proceeds by
way of three stages,
theoretical, practical,
and aesthetical activi-
ty," Enc. Brlt.,X,
p. 24.
SCHOPENHAUER, 1788-1860 —
Life is self -realizing will,
which turns out to be blind
force.
DARWIN, SPENCER, HUXLEY
,
et AL.
,
1850-1900.
BERGSON, 1859
There is a creative as
well as a genetic fac-
tor operative in evolu-
tion, both under the in-
fluence of an Intuitive
"elan vital,"
DRIESCH, 1867
There is in matter a vi-
tal factor which is the
dynamic of its motion
and the essence of its
reality.
a
L
D. The psychological or psychotropic theory of
evolution .based on these conclusions, is best formu-
lated in Dr. Albert P. Mathews's article, "The Road

1
of Evolution" .
This paper is so highly significant, not
only for theories of evolution, hut also for theories
of Religious Education that a digest of its contents
is in order at this point in the argument of this
dissertation:
I. The Trend of Evolution "Upward toward the
mind" Psychotroplsm :
"The tree of life grows upward toward the
mind and we do not know why. It is psychotropic not
only in its main stem but in its twigs and branches."
2
A. The Darwinian Error:
1. Misconception of evolution as strife
between members of the same species;
2, Failure to explain the functioning of
evolution along with the establishment
of the fact.
B. Attempted Corrections:
1. Lamarck "A primary and predominant
cause" anagenesis and kinetogenesis.
2. Wallace "Some higher force of an
intelligent nature."
3. Spencer "Action and reaction between
environment and organism."
4. Bergson "Direction without aiming at
ends," invention in adaptations.
5. Mathews "Struggle with environment;"
"G-od reproducing by fission;" a "pro-
cess of creating an individual."
"Evolution is the splitting off of an or-
ganism from its environment. Considered as a process
rather than as a road, it is the struggle of life
1. Yale Review, Vol. IX, No. 2, Jan. '22, pp.
3^0-352.
2. Page 341.
•
with its environment, a struggle for freedom, lead-
ing to the triumph of the mind and the winning of in-
dividuality; it is the struggle of the spirit with-
in us to be superior to matter, to escape the tram-
mels of matter, to secure a fuller individual life and
a larger freedom."
1
II. The Way of Evolution "The winning of freedom"
..... Individuation ;
A. The evolution of the Macrocosm From no-
thing to a nebula to a glorified slime with
a "capacity of struggling against environ-
ment .
B. The evolution of the Microcosm "A win-
ning of freedom from the environment:"
1. The evolution of vertebrates Gra-
dual emancipation from environmental
limitations
:
In winning freedom the organisms were "ex-
posed to greater and more sudden environmental chan-
ges to which they must react in some adaptive manner
so as to preserve their equilibrium. As a result
they had to develop a quicker, more purposeful , inge-
nious reaction to these changes, and this resulted in
and caused the further perfectioning of the nervous
system by v/hich environmental change is perceived and
reacted to."
2
2. The evolution of man G-radual acqui-
sition of prevision and provision, pur-
poses and values:
Man's "sensitiveness to change in the en-
vironment is so superior that he can not only react
with an adaptive response to any environmental change
but in addition he can foresee and provide intelli-
gently for such changes."
3
Evolution is "a struggle for liberty of
which man has secured the largest amount."
4
1. Page 344. 2. Page 350.
3. Page 350. 4. Page 350.
t
"It is by adaptation to changeableness that
this general trend upward is produced. Speed and pre-
cision of reaction have "been constantly selected and
improved until prevision of change has been obtained.
"It is the nervous system, the qualities of
the mind, memory, intelligence
, j udgment , which have
been selected. It is Intelligence , and in the later
stages foresight and mutual helpfulness , which have gi-
ven survival.
1
"It is victory over our own flesh which is
desirable not over our fellow-men. That is the les-
son of evolution. It is only when man is completely
free that he may say the universe consists of two
things, of himself and all else. Our aspirations, our
longings for freedom, our desire to rise superior to
circumstances and not to be overwhelmed by them what-
ever their nature may be, our courage, our hope, all
these are but the subjective aspects of that great ob-
jective struggle for liberty which we call evolution."
2
III. The Goal of Evolution "The city of man's
desire; the castle of his will freedom for
the spirit, that part of the immortal conscious -
ness of the universe, which is imprisoned within
us" Immortality
:
"Evolution is the spirit struggling to throw
off the trammels of matter. Is it not the same spirit
come to consciousness which inspires our poets
the same spirit which exclaims Death, where is thy
sting?' '0 Grave, where is thy victory? 1 The goal of
evolution can it be anything else than immortali-
ty?"
3
The significance and superiorities of Ma-
thews's theory become more apparent in a columnar con-
trast of its principles with those of strictly Darwi-
nian or biological evolution:
1. Page 350.
2. Page 351.
3. Page 351.
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E. Mathews's theory receives convincing support
1 2 3
from Bergs on
,
Lloyd Morgan , and Noble :
Mathews states specifically in his article,
"The Road of Evolution," to what extent he draws on
Bergson for his theory; also to what extent he goes
beyond him in finding biological adaptations purpo-
sive rather than merely "inventive". The distinction
1. Creative Evolution . 2. Emergent Evolution.
3. Purposive Evolution.

carries a valid criticism of the whole theory of "cre-
ative evolution," as formulated "by Bergson; it allows
for the introduction of novelty "but refers it to an ex-
traneous creativity, the elan vital or life-principle,
which pervades everything and works against, rather
than with, natural forces. The interpretation thus he-
comes mechano-dualistic without satisfactory explana-
tion of the final triumph of creative over natural
forces.
Lloyd Morgan avoids this dilemma "by insist-
ing that creative forces "emerge" from natural forces
as a result of a combination of elements already pre-
sent in preceding stages of the process. This is sug-
gestive but fails to fulfill its promise of finality,
as Driesch and Wildon Carr set forth in their admira-
1
ble criticisms of it . It turns out to be chemico-me-
chanistic with a G-od syringed into the test-tube to
explain the miracle of "emergence." Nevertheless it
makes progress over Bergson in the direction of Noble,
who, with Mathews, refers creativity and emergence, a-
like, to an immanent idea or Mind, which is for Mathews
"intelligence," and for Noble "purpose."
The latter virtually sets forth his thesis
1. Proceedings of the Sixth International Con-
gress of Philosophy ,~~I9"2oT pp. 1-19.
#
in a quotation from Charles Richet:
"Selection is a true theory. It estab-
lishes that organisms struggle against
each other it does not give any ac-
count of the cause which makes them
struggle. Selection is only a part of
the problem. We must look further a-
field. Beneath the mathematico-chemi-
co-physical mechanism which giverns us
we feel hovering vaguely something of
the nature of a directing idea the
expression is that of Claude Bernard."
This sug-
gests the extent to which his theory explains evolu-
tion as Mind growing through the realization of cos-
mic and microcosmic purposes ; hence psychotropic in
an even fuller sense than Mathews uses the term.
It may be added that the quantum hypothesis
and Einstein's doctrine of relativity, in their empha
sis on irregular, relative, unpredictable factors in
normative experience, are congenial with this interpre
tation of evolution; also A. S. Eddington 1 s astrophy
sical arguments for God, Freedom and Immortality in
his Glfford Lectures for 1927, now published in a
1
book entitled The Nature of the Phy sical World • Wil
11am P. Montague indicates the trend of its thought
when he says:
"When a scientist of the first rank stoops
1. New York, Macmillan, 1928.
2. The Saturday Review of Literature, March 23,
1929, p. 800.
I#
to expound for the benefit of the lay
reader the most recent and recondite the-
ories in his own field, it is an event.
And when the author is, as in this case,
not only a scientist and expounder of sci-
ence but a Christian mystic who inter-
prets the philosophic significance and de-
fends the religious implications of his
austere formulas, things may be expected
to happen; and they do. The book is real
ly gorgeous."
F. In the light of these conclusions evolution
may be redefined as follows:
Evolution is the method by which man, co-
operating with G-od, can work out his own salvation,
release himself from the trammels of matter and a-
chieve the eternal freedom of the spirit.
G-. With evolution thus psychologically as well
as biologically grounded there is no conflict between
geology and G-enesis, science and Religion, since:
Evolution is the process by which God has
lifted man from soil to soul, has breathed His spirit
Consciousness into the dust of the earth and
made it more than matter, mind, and more than mecha-
nism, purpose, memory, value, persons
.
H. Accordingly evolution, psychotropically in-
terpreted, is seen to be the biological source of i-
<
dealistlc norms in Religious Education, because:
1. ) It provides a scientific and philoso-
phical basis for character -building;
2. ) It introduces a Divine Spirit into the
experience of the universe without excluding person-
al responsibility:
Both of these conclusions are supported by
the whole argument of Hobhouse's Mind in Evolution
and come to summary expression in its concluding pa-
1
ragraph :
"If this ideal of thought," it reads,
"may be taken as adumbrating the ultimate
nature of Reality, nature is neither whol-
ly blind, nor wholly the creature of intel-
ligent purpose. Origin and purpose are mu-
tually dependent parts of one scheme. What
was in the beginning was in order that what
might be might be realized. But what shall
be and the way in which it shall come about,
are equally the creations of that which was
at first. If we seek to realize in some
concrete fashion what this means, we shall
think once more of the germ of a soul in a
living organism. The soul would not exist
in germ, but that there is laid up in store
for it a futurity which repays the travail
of development. Neither could it exist but
for the physical conditions in which it is
immersed. Its development is a war with
these conditions which maintain and yet li-
mit it, and its triumph is the submission
of the conditions to its perfected nature.
In this image we have a brief account of
the whole process of the evolution of Mind
as traced in these chapters, and therewith
1. Page 446.
r
the process of evolution on this earth
appears as the working out in concrete
shape and on this relatively narrow stage
of the vaster process which we dimly con-
ceive as constituting the essential life
of the world, n
3. ) Its trend is toward freedom, under which
alone moral development is possible;
4. ) By elevating intelligent conquests a-
bove Instinctive adjustments it gives promise of con-
trol in experience;
5. ) It is consistent with the spirit of the
1
Christian Scriptures
,
which, among Christians, furnish
religious sanctions for moral standards.
1. Cf. Psalms 107:30: "He brlngeth them unto
their desired haven;" and Matthew 16:26: "What shall
a man give in exchange for his soul?"

"It is not birth-rates that
want raising, "but Ideals."
H. G. WELLS,
Mankind in the Making;

CHAPTER III
The SOCIOLOGICAL SOURCE of RELIGIOUS
EDUCATION: EUTHENICS
Evolution, as the argument of Chapter II
has demonstrated, is admittedly only a method, modal
not causal. Through it one sees "the wheels go
1 round" without finding the motive-power which im-
parts the rotation or the steering gear that gives it
direction. The former is, from a Self-Psychological
standpoint, Consciousness or G-od; the latter is, ac-
1
cording to Thomson
,
heredity.
"The process of evolution," he says, "is
a long-drawn-out process of testing all
things and holding fast that which is good.
The variations or the novelties are the
qualities to be tested; the struggle for
existence, which includes the organism's
endeavors, is the sieve that tests; here-
dity secures the holding fast of what has
proved good."
That is, heredity is one of the major means
"by which evolution achieves its end, individuality,
immortality. Or is it? Is character of the sort
that presages eternal life "inherited," as "a certain
2
young man" "believed milleniums ago? Or does one
1. Outline of Science , Vol, II, pp. 369-371.
2. Cf. Mark 10:17.
82
(
have to do something sacrificial to attain it, as he
learned to his "sorrowing"? Is morality a gift or an
achievement? If it is the former, Religious Education
becomes, as has already been suggested in Chapter I, a
multiplication of entities or nonentities "be-
yond necessity." The expression suggests the action
usually recommended by determinists, a judicious use
of "Occam's razor" in the interests of moral, as well
as metaphysical, economy. But does a study of heredi-
ty warrant such summary action? On the contrary, as
this chapter will show, its ramifications lead, eventu-
ally, to a sociological source of Religious Education,
as valid as it is Inescapable, Euthenics.
Spencer's definition of heredity, while
Definition classic, merely states its law without sug-
of
Heredity gesting the aura of implication which makes
it significant for Religious Education.
1
It reads:
"Understood in its entirety, the law is
that each plant or animal, if it reproduces,
gives origin to others like itself, the
likeness consisting not so much in the re-
petition of individual traits as in the as-
sumption of the same general structure."
The deficiency here is remedied somewhat
1. Principles of Biology, Vol. I, p. 301.
ct
(
1
in Thomson's definition, which says :
"Heredity is the relation of organic con-
tinuity "between successive generations, the
living on of the past in the present, the
flesh-and-blood linkage between an indivi-
dual and his forebears on the one hand, his
offspring on the other. The individual is
like a lens into which rays from parentage
and ancestry converge, from which they di-
verge again to progeny. Heredity is the
reproductive relation which secures that
like tends to beget like and yet seldom
does .
"
Thus heredity is seen to be, at most, a ten-
dency toward resemblance between congenitally adjacent
individuals in the evolutionary series. Narrowing the
concept to man the "resemblance" is found to consist,
2
according to Dr. Athearn , of a triple heritage:
1.) Physical or individual A plastic
organism responsible for instincts:
The accent here is on the "plastic". Even
Professor Coe, behavioristic as he has become, is
3
forced to acknowledge the importance of "preferenti-
al functions" and virtually to accept the more per-
sonalistic position stated by Dr. Athearn: "The
greater the mental development, the more plastic the
physical organism and the greater the range of accom-
1. Outline of Science , Vol. II, p. 369.
2. Lectures, Boston University, 1921-1922.
3. The Psychology of Religion , pp. 14-42.

modation; thus education may decrease the dependence
of the Individual on heredity." In this way the em-
phasis in organic life is shifted from chance to
choice and its direction is made a matter of nurture
as well as nature.
2. ) Environmental or social Relations
characterized by institutions:
Heredity is social as well as individual.
Only those forms can live in which heritage and sur-
rounding circumstances are accommodated to each other.
This social heritage is admirably revealed and evalu-
1
ated by Thomson, who declares :
"Unlike the beasts that perish, man has a
lasting external heritage, capable of end-
less modification for the better, a heri-
tage of ideas and ideals embodied in prose
and verse, in statue and painting, in cathe-
dral and university, in tradition and con-
vention, and above all in society it self • "
Apparently there is truth as well as poetry in Words
-
2
worth's comment on heredity :
" not in utter nakedness
But trailing clouds of glory do we come
From G-od, who is our home."
3. ) Mental or personal Consciousness or
1. Heredity, p. 249.
2. "Ode on the Intimations of Immortality."
•
mind, functioning through intelligent Interests:
Man is born with instincts, a biological be
quest; but he finds the field for their functioning
in a sociological complex and the secret of their
growth in psychological processes ..... intelligence.
His life, even the most physical activity of it, is
shot through with mind, as Professor Mathews, himself
1
a biologist admits when he says :
"The tree of life grows upward toward the
mind and we do not know why. It is psycho-
tropic not only in its main stem but in its
twigs and branches."
2
Later he almost fathoms the secret of the "why".
"It is by adaptation to changeableness, "he
argues that "this general trend upward is
produced. Speed and precision of reaction
have been constantly selected and improved
until prevision of change has been obtained.
It is intelligence and, in the later sta-
ges, foresight and mutual helpfulness which
have given survival."
To summarize One inherits an organism
and an environment; in so far as he is concerned
these are matters of chance; he cannot, as Heine
suggested, "be very careful in the selection of his
parents;" but he is left to determine by choice, in
a large number of instances, the adjustment of his or
1. "The Road of Evolution," p. 341.
2. Ibid., p. 351.
•
ganlsm to his environment. Instincts are a powerful
factor in his life; also institutions; but the in-
teraction of the two which produces responses to situ-
ations, complexes, tendencies, character, personality,
is determined by an even more potent factor, active
mind or intelligence.
The close connection between evolution
Explanations : and heredity necessitated an explana-
Darwln tion of the latter by exponents of the
Pangenesis former.
Darwin himself was the first to rea-
lize this fact. His theory, more poetic than scien-
1
tiflc, was known as pangenesis • Briefly it held that
the body cells bud and throw off seeds or gemmules, which
gradually make their way to the reproductive cells and
become "bearers of heredity." Allowed to germinate,
they develop into the parts of the body corresponding
to those from which they have budded, and are, accor-
dingly, like them. All the body cells, then, and not
merely the reproductive cells, make their appropriate
contribution to the inheritance of the resultant orga-
nism; hence pangenesis. G-alton is credited with ha-
ving disproved the theory by blood-transfusion tests
with rabbits. The blood of one breed should, pange-
1. Enc. Brit., Vol. VII, p. 842. Cf. Darwin,
The Variation of Animals and Plants under Domestica -
tion ; also Thomson, Heredity, pp. 402-403.

netically, have carried its gemmules to the reproduc-
tive cells of another breed, which would be, in turn,
appropriately modified in the progeny. This did not
happen here or in other experiments conducted with the
most scientific precision. Accordingly pangenesis
passed out of the academic picture into what scien-
tists and philosophers of an anti-literary genre de-
light to call "the limbo of exploded poetry."
What was not poetical in Dar-
Lamarck win's theory of heredity was bi-
The
Transmission ological, physiological, physi-
©f
Acquired Characters cal. It is not surprising,
1
then, that Lamarck, Darwin's
successor in the field, swung to the sociological, the
mental, and environmental. He contended that heredity
was largely a matter of intelligent adaptations and
that not only intelligence but also special intelli-
gences were inherited; that parents acquired abilities
or characters which were preserved and passed on to
their posterity, and that the likenesses between proge-
ny and ancestors were to be referred to such a "trans-
mission of acquired characters," "modifications of
structure acquired in the individual lifetime as the
direct result of peculiarities in homes, food, and
1. Cf . Bagley, The Educative Process
, (New York,
Macmillan, 1924) pp. 10-13.
f
1
function."
Acquired characters are, then, as Thomson
points out in another connection, "impressed from with-
out" "indents or imprints" rather than the "out-
2
comes" represented by variations and mutations.
Lamarck's theory of the transmission of such
"acquired characters" persisted only until it was test-
ed. Transferred from story to laboratory, it languish-
ed and vanished when Weismann proved conclusively that
"the reproductive cells which have the potentiality of
becoming offspring, never arise from differentiated bo-
dy cells." At present the hypothesis is so far discre-
dited that Thomson feels justified in asserting that
Science has yet to record a single authenticated in-
stance of the transmission of acquired characteristics
by heredity.
And yet Professor William McDougall's recent
experiments with rats have given rise to a revived La-
marckianism. They have involved tests for speed in
escape from a tank having two exits: the one lighted
by an electric bulb and charged with electricity; the
other, dark, but without painful accompaniments. The
data show that the progeny of trained rats escape by
the right exit on first trial twenty -four per cent more
accurately than that of untrained rats. These fl-
1. Outline of Science
,
II, p. 375. 2. Ibid., 374.
Ic
gures seem to carry incontrovertible evidence of the
transmission of acquired characters _in rats ; but, as
McDougall would be the first to admit, one must still
reckon with obvious differences between rats and men.
Until these can be eliminated Welsmann-
Weismarm ism will continue to be the most general
-
1
Continuity ly accepted explanation of heredity. It
of the
Germ-Plasm takes its name from August Weismann, who
first enunciated the theory. It is his
contention that heredity can be explained neither by
particles thrown off by the whole organism nor by cha-
racters acquired from its environment. As over against
pangenesis he insists that the units of germ-plasm are
not "gemmules" but "idants;" and that each idant "con-
tains all the possibilities generic, specific, in-
dividual -— of a new organism, or rather the direct-
ing substance which, in appropriate surroundings of
food etc., forms a new organism. " That is, the Idants
are not only complex, but continuous, and, so, imper-
vious to somatic or mental characters imprinted from
without. Accordingly Weismann 1 s views discredit La-
marckianism along with pangenesis, and substitute for
them the still current doctrine of the continuity of
the germ-plasm.
Nevertheless, it must be added, even Weis-
1. See A. Weismann, The G-erm-Plasm , New York, 1893,
Vortr|ge fiber die Pes zendentheori
e
t Jena, 1904; also
Thomson, Heredity, pp. 410-411.

mann concedes that the germ-plasm resides in somatic
cells, and may, therefore, be so conditioned by them
as to permit the transmission of modified, if not ac-
quired, characters.
1
This means, as Thomson points out , that
"the changes which make for racial progress are vari-
ations and mutations arising from within, from distur-
bances and rearrangements, permutations and combinati-
ons, in the germ-cells from which new individuals a-
rise." Also that modifications of somatic cells may
release potentialities in reproductive cells that have
hitherto been dormant.
A development of the latter idea is
Modifications to be found in the DeVriesian hypothe-
De Vrles :
Mutations 3 is, which holds that progress in spe-
cies comes not through continuity, but
variety "mutations."
2
"New species," says DeVries , "are produced
from existing forms by sudden leaps. The pa-
rent-type itself remains unchanged through-
out this process, and may repeatedly give
birth to new forms."
He attempts to prove his thesis by data secured from
experiments with evening primroses. But, as was re-
marked of McDougall's rats, what is true of primroses
1. Outline of Science , Vol. II, p. 375
2. Species and their Varieties
, their Origin by
Mutation
, Preface, p. 6.
t
may not be true of men. DeVrieaianlsm,at best, mere-
ly points a tendency without formulating its laws. One
can scarcely build a consistent theory of heredity on
data so unstable as "fluctuations" and "mutations."
A more adamantine foundation for such a
Mendel structure may be found in Mendelism,
Unlt -
Characters which not only conserves all that is va-
lid in Weismannlsm but also Introduces
new features which do much to simplify the problem of
heredity.
1 2
Mendel's law , as stated by Bateson , holds
that the "germ-cells or gametes produced by cross-
bred organisms may, in respect of given characters,
be of pure parental types and consequently incapable
of transmitting the opposite character; that when
such pure, similar gametes of opposite sexes are u-
nited, the individuals so formed and their posterity
are free from all taint of the cross; that there may
be, in short, perfect or almost perfect discontinuity
between these germs in respect of one of each pair of
opposite characters,"
This means, as Thomson elaborates the
3
law
, that "definite characters for good or ill whe-
1. See Mendel, Versuche fiber Pflanzenhybrlden
,
translated by W. E. Castle, Genetics and Eugenics
, Ap-
pendix, pp. 281-321.
2. Thomson, Heredity, p. 348.
3« Outline of Science , Vol. II, p. 377.
••
ther dominant or recessive do not disappear; they
persistently reappear in their original purity."
1
From this C. B. Davenport has formulated
his theory of unit -characters, according to which
traits are inherited independently as units through
determiners in the germ-cell. Thus parent and child
resemble each other because they are derived from the
same germ-plasm; "the son is half-brother of his fa-
ther by another mother."
The Mendelian hypothesis is undoubtedly
true with regard to certain "characters;" in fact it
may be charted for eyes, hair, and, in part, mental
structure. It is demonstrable that not only imperfect
mental development but also inability to withstand
stress upon the nervous system is certainly transmis-
sible from the parent to the child. On the other hand
Dr. G-oddard has virtually proved that "when both pa-
rents are feeble-minded all of the children will be
so likewise; but if one of the parents be normal and
of normal ancestry, all of the children may be normal.
This necessitates the conclusion that the "law" while
true of peas and waltzing mice is no more constant as
applied to mental and moral traits than is the DeVries
ian principle when transferred from primroses to men,
1. Heredity and Eugenics , pp. 269-271; 275-288.
•
or even animals, »
Out of this maze of consistent and con-
Concluslons tra&lctory theories one may still reach
a few rather definite conclusions with
regard to heredity:
1. ) Pangenesis has been disproved.
2. ) Lamarckianism has been discredited but
not discarded: Modified, if not acquired, characte-
ristics may be transmissible; moreover where they
are not inherited they may be acquired more readily
through an inherited predisposition for them,
3. ) G-erm-plasm, the basic element in here-
dity is complex and continuous, but conditioned by
the general health of its somatic accompaniments and
subject to modification through the release of dormant
1
potentialities: The authority here is Thomson :
"The stimuli of outside changes may saturate
through the organism and provoke the complex
germ-cells to change. * * * An environmen-
tal stimulus penetrating through the body
serves as the liberator or stimulus of vari-
ability in the germ-cells."
2
And again:
"It should not be forgotten that differences
in diet determine whether the grub of a bee
is to develop into a worker or into a queen."
1. Outline of Science
, Vol. II, p. 378
2. Ibid., p. 379.
•
4. ) Mutations occur in the progress of spe-
cies but without sufficient constancy to admit of de-
finite formulation such as would show a demonstrable
relation to heredity; these mutations or variations
represent the organism's attempts at self-expression
and are all -important in the process of evolution;
nevertheless the evidence seems to show that they can
be evoked more successfully by nurture than by nature,
that they are probably an intelligent conquest rather
than a biological bequest, that they are achieved by
education rather than given by heredity,
5. ) The Mendelian law is true within cer-
tain limits, more especially as it comes to expressi-
on in the current theory of chromosomes, which refers
unit-characters to combinations of chromatin granules
in the nucleus of a reproductive cell kept continuous
by a protective cytosome reinforced by a membrane,
6. ) G-alton 1 s Law —- "An inheritance is not
merely dual, but through the parents it is multiple,
and the average contribution made by grandparents etc,
is definite and diminishes in a precise ratio accord-
ing to the remoteness of the ancestors." is even
more generally valid than Mendel's,
Nevertheless:
I•
7.) Despite recent progress in the study of
heredity, certain factors still make its direction so
unpredictable that one is justified in saying as Spen-
1
cer did , several decades ago:
"A positive explanation of heredity is not
to be expected in the present state of bio-
logy. We can look for nothing beyond the
simplification of the problem and a reducti-
on of it to the same category with certain
other problems which also admit of hypothe-
tical solution only."
8.) The significance of these conclusions
for Moral and Religious Education is admirably ex-
2
pressed by Prof, Thomson, when he says :
"If the beneficial results of improved
function and environment are not, as such,
transmitted, it becomes all the more urgent
that they should be reimpressed on each
successive generation. If they are not en-
tailed then it is all the more important
that they should be reacquired. Moreover
these ameliorations of nurture may serve as
the liberating stimuli that encourage the
unfolding of new variations of a useful
sort."
Applications of these theories to prob-
Applications lems of social practice and social con-
trol have given rise to the fundamen-
tal issue in present-day sociology, the validity of
the claims of eugenics as over against environmental
-
ism and the possibility of a synthesis such as will
1. Principles of Biology, I, p. 663.
2 * Online of Science
,
II, p. 376.

conserve the essential truth in both without surren-
dering to either.
Eugenics is that sociological theory
Eugenics: which holds that race-improvement is es-
Definition sentially a matter of individual endow-
ment and that it can, accordingly, be
most effectually promoted by selective breeding. It
insists that "blood always tells" not only the first
chapter but the whole story; that a person is poten-
tially and actually his corpuscular content, red, white,
and especially blue. The process is predominantly bi-
ological to such an extent that what is proved of gui-
nea-pigs and white mice is predicated with equal posi-
tlveness of persons. In fact, as Clarence Darrow
1
points out
,
"Most of the evidence on which the euge-
nists rest their case has come from the stu-
dy of animals whose love-affairs have been
controlled and dictated in the interest of
science."
The data gathered from such experimentation undoubt-
edly yield valuable information on heredity. Darrow,
with his regard for evidence and logic would be the
first to admit as much. But he is equally right in
insisting that conclusions so sweeping as many of the
1. "The Edwardses and the Jukeses," The Ameri-
can Mercury, October, 1925 , p. 147.

eugenists make, should not be drawn from limited in-
stances.
Theoretically, eugenics is thorough-go
-
Theoretical ing Weismannlsm, as Darrow implies when
Basis he says of its most famous formulation,
1
the overworked Edwardses and Jukeses:
"It concerns, as you will recall, the sur-
prising adventures of the progeny of one,
Max Jukes (the villain) and one, Jonathan
Edwards (the hero), "both pursued by a relent-
less fate (the germ -plasm;
Along with this Weismannism, there is, inconsistently
enough, more than a hint of DeVriesianism. For the
eugenist holds not only to the inviolability of the
germ-plasm but also to the transmissibllity of mu-
tations. The sporting Max Jukes reproduced his capa-
city for villainy just as surely as the non-waltzing
Pastor Edwards reproduced his capacity for Calvinism
and fecundity. This latter according to Darrow' s ap-
praisal of him. It does not, perhaps, show a proper
respect for the cloth. Darrow doesn't. He approach-
es the eugenists and their hero, the Rev. Mr. Edwards,
from their viewpoint, the biological . .... never mind
the theological.
More critically, eugenics undertakes, com-
mendably enough, to protect society against the pro-
1. "The Edwardses and the Jukeses," p. 147.
(
pagatlon of the physically and mentally unfit. It
emphasizes the truth of the continuity of the germ-
plasm and applies it, in many instances most intelli-
gently, to problems of social progress. Its findings
and some of its recommendations demand the highest re
spect and the constant consideration of social work-
ers and religious educators. At the same time it is
frequently grossly unscientific in drawing its con-
clusions from selected facts and in making the histo-
ry of a few families, notably the Edwardses and Jukes
es and Kallikaks, normative for human nature. It is
further cross -sectional, and, so, unphilosophical, in
that:
1.) It lifts the individual out of his so-
cial relations as if he were only organism with in-
stincts and not complex functioning through instituti
ons. This is Darrow's contention in his closing
argument for the prosecution, Eugenics being on tri-
1
al :
"The Jukes story is the story of any other
family environed as they were. Living in a
sterile country, surrounded by poverty, con-
demned by conditions which have always been
common to certain localities, they developed
a manner of living and acquired a reputation
which as social heritages were passed on from
1. "The Edwardses and the Jukeses," p. 157.

generation to generation. * * * * * The
Edwards es were a family in the fertile
Connecticut river valley a family in
which a few members having fame were able
to pass this heritage to others down the
line. Why go out of the way even to in-
fer that the germ-plasm had anything to
do with either case?"
2. ) Its unmodified Welsmannism is not al-
together consistent with its DeVriesian transmission
of mutations. Jonathan Edwards propagated a pi-
ous progeny. In DeVriesian parlance he was the sport
Ing evening primrose, whose "path" he so puritanical-
ly eschewed. But what became of the adulterous germ-
plasm of Elizabeth Tuttle, for which he was certainly
trustee? Why was it not so "continuous" as the equal
ly potent but more discreet Jonathan 1 s was to be from
his time forward?
3. ) It ignores the discontinuity of the
germ-plasm demonstrated by Mendel and generally ac-
knowledged in modern scientific theories of heredity.
Accordingly Darrow is justified in the contemptu-
ous gesture with which he waives the charges against
1
the Jukeses :
"When one ceases to talk in vague genera-
lities about 'good and bad blood 1 and be-
gins to talk about unit -determiners and
chromosomes (which is the only language
that a really scientific biologist can un-
1. "The Edwardses and the Jukeses," p. 156
I
derstand) the case against the heredity
of the Jukeses "begins to assume an entire-
ly different appearance,"
It is not surprising, then, that
Env 1ronmentalism eugenics has evoked its appropriate
reaction, environmentalism, with
an accent on social or racial rather than individual
traits.
The theory holds that race-improvement
Definition is largely a matter of environmental sti-
muli and that it can, accordingly be best
promoted by proper conditioning. It insists that blood
is chameleonic, assuming the color of the cup into
which it is poured coffee, tea, or butter —- and
that the germ-plasm, precious or vicious, Max's, Jo-
nathan's, or Elizabeth's, is impotent beyond the field
of structure.
1
"Let us lay forever," says John B. Watson
,
"the ghost of inheritance of aptitudes, of
'mental' characteristics, of special abili-
ties not based upon favorable structure such
as throat -formation in singing, hand in play-
ing, structurally sound ears etc."
Environmentallsm questions not only the transmission
but the very existence of the instincts out of which
the eugenists evolve the individual organism; they
are only reactions to social stimuli, as material and
1. Behaviorism
, p. 77

as immaterial as "boomerangs returning mechanically to
1
the environmental point of departure. The individual
is merely the sum-total of his institutional behavior-
patterns. The family-tree is as grass, growing mostly
underground; it has no fruit. Man is not begotten;
he is made by the surroundings into which he happens
to be born.
"It is what happens to individuals after
birth that makes one a hewer of wood and a
drawer of water, another a diplomat, a thief,
a successful business man or a far-famed
scientist. What our advocates of freedom
in 1776 took no account of is the fact that
Deity himself could not equalize 40-year
old individuals who have had such different
environmental training as have the American
people."
2
Theoretically environmentalism is in
Theoretical unstable equilibrium between a revived
Basis Lamarckianlsm and a skepticism of all
hereditarian hypotheses. Its affini-
ties for Lamarckianlsm are properly remarked by W. I*
Thomas in his review of Prof. Child's Psychological
3
Foundations of Behavior .
"At many points," he observes, "and on the
whole Child' s position looks very much like
a form of Lamarckianlsm, though he does not
declare himself in that way. He views here-
dity as no more or less than the memory of
past experience a position taken by He-
ring some fifty years ago • An excitation,
4
1. Cf. Watson, Behaviorism
,
Chap. VI. 2. Ibid. ,212.
3. The New Republic, Sept. 30, 1925, p. 8.
4. Cf. Edgell, Theories of Memory, pp. 5-28.

he says, may be transient, but if it per-
sists long enough to produce differences
in protoplasmic conditions, long enough to
be organically remembered, it may become a
physiological axis that is, determine
structure. The protoplasm remembers in
the sense that the stimulus leaves effects
which persist for a longer or shorter time,
and its later behavior is altered by this
memory. The establishment of physiologi-
cal gradients and the growth of structure
in this connection are to be regarded as
a process of learning."
The "past experiences" thus "learned", remembered, and
transmitted, become a "social heritage", which, much
more potently than "continuous" chromosomes, deter-
mines whether the progeny shall be Jukeses "they
developed a manner of living and acquired a reputation
which as social heritages were passed on from generati-
on to generation" or Edwardses "a family in
which a few members having fame were able to pass this
heritage down the line to others." Whether social or
individual this savors of the transmission of acquired
characters Lamarckianism. And yet there is the
thorough-going skepticism of Watson 1 s behaviorism,
which has "laid forever the ghost of inheritance of
aptitudes, of 'mental characteristics', of special a-
bilitles," including instincts.
Even this cursory view of environmental
-
Criticism Ism reveals its outstanding fallacies:
1.) Scientifically, it ignores the con-
(.
tinuity and discontinuity of the germ-plasm, demon-
strated by Welsmann and Mendel, respectively, and ge
nerally accepted by "biologists thinking in terms of
unit -determiners and chromosomes."
1
Accordingly Watson can rhapsodize : "Our
conclusion is, then, that we have no real
evidence of the inheritance of traits. I
would feel perfectly confident in the ul-
timately favorable outcome of careful up-
bringing of a healthy, well-formed baby
born of a long line of crooks, murderers,
thieves, and prostitutes. Who has any evi-
dence to the contrary? Many, many thou-
sands of children yearly, bom from moral
households and steadfast parents, become
wayward, steal, become prostitutes, through
one mishap or another of nurture. Many more
thousands of sons and daughters of the
wicked grow up to be wicked because they
couldn't grow up any other way in such sur-
roundings.
"I should like to go one step further
and say, give me a dozen Wealthy infants,
well -formed, and my own specified world to
bring them up in and I'll guarantee to take
any one at random and train him to become
any type of specialist I might select
into a doctor, lawyer, artist, merchant
-
chief, and, yes, even into a beggar-man and
thief, regardless of his talents, penchants,
tendencies, abilities, vocations and race
of his ancestors. I am going beyond my
facts and I admit it, but so have the advo-
cates of the contrary and they have been do-
ing it for many thousands of years."
2.) Psychologically, envlronmentalism is
behaviorism, the untenabillty of which, except when
supplemented by purpose, has already been demonstra-
ted in Chapter I.
1. Behaviorism
, pp. 75-76.

3.) Pe&agogically , environmentalism, with
its over-emphasis on social inheritance, leads to such
educational vagaries as the theories of racial recapi-
tulation, which dominated pedagogy for so many years
and which impeded, rather than promoted its progress.
These are still so prevalent in certain quarters as
to make the subject a matter of special concern for
Religious Education.
Racial recapitulation, as an edu-
Rac lal cational theory, is most succinct-
Recapltulatlon : 1
Formulation ly formulated in Von Baer 1 s law:
and
Proofs "The individual in its development
passes through or recapitulates
the various stages which the race has passed through
in reaching the stage represented by the individual."
supported "by a threefold proof: 1.) Embryologi-
cal The human embryo in its development passes
through morphological stages which resemble various
stages experienced by the race in its progress from
primitive to present manhood; 2.) Paleontological -
—
Fossil remains reveal the fact that racial develop-
ment has paralleled animal development from the amoe-
ba to the monkey; 3.) Logical It follows from
these premises that recapitulation is a basic law of
nature and, possibly the essential principle of pro-
1. Enc. Brit., "Embryology," Vol. IX, p. 323.

gress.
Applications of such reasoning to practical
pedagogy have begotten a varied progeny:
1.) The Culture -Epoch Theory:
Theories This holds that, if race-recapitulation
is the basic law of progress, it is necessa-
ry for each individual to pass through each ancestral
epoch in the evolution of culture; accordingly cur-
ricula should follow the order of culture epochs:
a.) Savage; b.) Greek; c.) Roman; d.) Germanic;
e.) Chivalrlc; f.) Renaissance; g.) Reformative or
puritanical.
The fallacies here are not far to find:
a, ) The evidences from embryology and pale-
ontology indicate that there are at best only resembla-
nces between individual and racial development and that
the human organism reproduces, at most, embryonic sta-
ges rather than adult types in preceding series; even
1
Dewey admits that "the exact parallelism of ontogeny
and phylogeny is confessedly weak,"
b. ) A study of children will show that in-
stincts appear functionally in response to needs ra-
ther than chronologically according to race. Thus, in
John Fox, Jr.'s The Little Shepherd of Kingdom Come
,
1. Cf . Cope, Primary Factors in Organic Evolution ,
pp. 209-210.
c
which, though fiction, is written to the life and i-
dealistically , "Chad" leaps directly from a savage, to
a Christian, stage, because his circumstances demand it
"0 God, I aint nothin' but a boy but I've gotta
act like a man now." — while Nathalla Crane seems, at
the age of twelve, to have reached a Renaissance stage
of reason and sophistication,
c.) Nature operates organically rather than
mechanically in the production of values. Progress is
a matter not of addition but of multiplication. Devel-
opment is not person plus person or experience plus ex-
perience but rather person times experience giving not
a sum but a product which includes intermediate stages
without reproducing them. Education is, thus, not re-
capitulation with definite limits to progress but mul-
tiplication with possibilities running into the fourth
dimension.
2.) Katharsis:
The so-called "kathartic" doctrine in peda-
gogy holds that instincts should be encouraged to ap-
pear in their racial order, should be indulged temper-
ately, and by such indulgence purged from one's sys-
tem as early as possible. The theory is a sort of vac-
cination against vice based upon the assumption that im
munity is insured by temperate indulgence. Go back to
i
Nature and obey Her impulses; leave Christ and His
crucifixion for Rousseau and his primrose path of
least resistance. Capitulate and recapitulate, be-
cause, as Dr. Athearn summarizes the rationale of the
1
theory :
"a.) If these instincts are not cul-
tivated at the time when they are natural-
ly strongest, their development is retard-
ed and they are likely to appear later in
perverted forms;
Mb.) The child not allowed to revel in
these instinctive occupations runs the risk
of arrested development from too early pre-
cocity;
"c.) The life of the child is rendered
many-sided, rich, and resourceful by means
of this rich and abundant fund of raw mate-
rial."
Accordingly, let instincts have their fling until the
child is nine or ten years old and then begin the pro
cess of selection and inhibition.
Again the fallacies are inartistically ob-
vious: a,) Indulgence is more likely to be narcotic
than kathartic; instincts grow with use and atrophy
with disuse; b.) Over -express ion much more surely
than suppression gives rise to perversions, as in the
case of Leopold and Loeb, the college -bred perverts,
who kidnaped, abused, and murdered Robert Franks;
c.) Non-inhibltive behavior -patterns, once acquired,
1. Lectures, Boston University, 1921-1922.
:
are almost ineradioably persistent "the child is
father of the man."
Katharsis? No. Rather a healthy control
such as makes purgation unnecessary.
Speaking in Mendelian terms, it wa3 a pre-
dictable certainty that some of the peas in the peda-
gogical pod, which is racial recapitulation, should be
white rather than black. These appear in the work of
Zlller, Lange, and Dewey, whose modifications of the
recapitulation idea almost redeem it:
3.) Apperception:
Ziller utilized the recapitulative doctrine
in a unique way, insisting that the mind "can best ap-
percelve facts when they are presented in the order of
their historical development, such as, an appreciation
of a modern reaper through a study of its genesis from
a scythe through a cradle to a binder."
Lange found the difficulty in Ziller 1 s the-
ory when he pointed out that "a child learns in the re-
verse order of development" from the fruit through
the tree to the root. It is not necessary, then, that
ideas should be presented to him in the order of their
historic genesis so long as they are presented in terms
of his experience. If he recapitulates anything, then,
cI
it is his own experience, so that a fern, seen for
the first time, is "a pot of green feathers." Out of
this idea cane the famous "Five Steps" in "The Method
of tie Recitation." They represent the classic formu-
lation of Herbartian learning through recapitulation of
past experience.
The outstanding defect of such learning by
past experience is that it collapses when applied to
science, which is concerned not only with develop-
ments but discoveries, and calls constantly for origi-
nal processes that cannot possibly be recapitulated.
John Dewey, realizing as much, has elaborated still a-
nother variation on the recapitulation theme, which,
like "apperception," introduces a redemption motif.
4.) Social participation:
Combining apperceptive and recapitulative
principles with others more congenial to the Zeitgeist,
Dewey insists that a child learns not only in terms of
past experience but also in terms of present needs, in-
1
terests, problems, projects. In satisfying these in-
terests, solving these problems, realizing these pro-
jects, the learner reaches out into science, history,
and the humanities, and, so, recapitulates that part of
the past which is useful for the fulfilment of present
needs. At the same time he is participating as well
1. See Dawey, Democracy and Education , p. 89 ff
.
(t
as recapitulating, discovering as well as developing.
Theoretically the idea is capital, but
practice has revealed certain shortcomings: a.) Pe-
dagogically, it argues for a learn-what-you-want-to,
as over against a learn-what -you-ought -to, system of
education that dissipates rather than develops, much
less disciplines, the self; b.) Psychologically, it
is thorough-going behaviorism, conduct without con-
scious coherence, experience without intelligence, pur-
poseless participation in a society that controls the
self and conditions its destiny; c.) Philosophical-
ly, it is pragmatism of the sort that confines value to
utility and truth to practicality a thing is true,
and, so, to be desired, to be learned, because it is
useful, because it "works," has cash value. It leaves
one wishing there were more philosophers like Nathalia
1
Crane who "could not stain romance with monetary fee."
And yet, it may be added, social participa-
tion is an essential, if not an exhaustive
,
principle
of pedagogy. It is grounded in racial recapitulation
but grows so far beyond it as to rise above the defects
which make that theory unacceptable, to wit: 1.) It
Final Appraisal is grounded in a fallacy of the u-
niversal, a conception of a race having reality apart
from the persons who comprise it; 2.) If the indivi-
1. Cf
. "Love" in The Janitor'
s
Boy, p. 20.
(* >t i*i i ;* » cl£ rf »i »j *
|
dual does recapitulate the race, such a recapitulation
is embryonic, perhaps, and, so, outside of the field of
sociology and pedagogy; 3.) Where racial characteris-
tics are recapitulated post-natally
,
they should be con
sidered vestigial rather than normative; 4.) Normative
education should encourage initiation as well as recapl
tulation, should be neither exclusively social nor in-
dividual but both, not racial but personal .
As the latter sentence implies morality is
much more a matter of direction and control than of en-
dowment and conditioning. Failure to realize this
fact explains the futility of eugenics as well as en-
vironmental ism. Each system shifts the responsibili-
ty for character from the person to the germ-plasm, in
one instance, and to social conditions in the other.
Thus, children are shrewd enough to be eugenists, bla-
ming their parents for their vices, while parents are
environmentalists, "passing the buck to society."
Since that is so evanescent as to be unindictable, no
one is held accountable.
"For this new age of freedom and speed,"
says Mrs. John M. Glenn, president of the
National Society of the Church Mission of
Help, "not youth is to blame, nor the pa-
rents of youth, but the social conditions
in which youth lives."
To which a writer in the New York Sun, as courageous
c
as he is anonymous, answers:
"A heavy responsibility lies at the
door of those who attach no "blame to the
modern parents who created these social
conditions and make no bones about enjoy-
ing them. A generation or two ago, ex-
tensive travel was rare, there were fewer
boarding schools and little effort made
to seek pleasures outside the home circle.
Today a child is scarcely weaned before
it is handed over to the care of aliens,
that the parents may engage in all kinds
of enjoyable activity, in which the child
has no part,
"If parents are to be exonerated
from blame for a situation for which Mrs.
G-lenn says social conditions of today are
responsible how can any improvement in
their children's behavior be brought about?
Does she deny that the training of a child
and the molding of its character are easi-
est done by the parents, provided they are
fit and worthy to have children?
"Let the- blame for 'running riot 1 and
for allowing their children's 'undirected
vitality and energy to be spent on trivial-
ities' be placed where it belongs —- on
the generation which brought about the con-
ditions under which we live and suf-
fer."
The solution of this dilemma demands a syn
Euthenlc
s
thetlc sociological system, which keeps re
sponslbility what it should be, both in-
dividual and social, personal. This is what Prof.
1
G-eorge E. Dawson has in mind when he says :
"The hope is springing up in some minds
that the entire problem of human regenerati-
on will be much simplified when men shall
have learned more fully of the nature of
1. The Control of Life through Environment
,
quot-
ed by E. H. Richards, Euthenics, p. 14.
It
their own lives, the nature of the physical
world that environs them, and the interac-
tion between this physical world and the spi-
rit of man which is set to subdue it.
1
And Carl Kelsey, also quoted by Miss Richards , echoes
the Judgment "We create the evil as well as the
good. Nature is impersonal. To an increasing degree
man determines . " while Miss Richards herself is
2
even more specific :
"The belief in better things must be tho-
roughly Impressed on the individual mind.
Each individual must understand that it
does affect him , that it is his concern,
that lie must give heed to his environment.
(The italics are Miss Richards 1 .) Then
he may have the will and make the effort
to combat dangers to body and mind. * * *
It is, after all, what a man determines
for himself and for his family that af-
fects both his views of life and his wish
to secure for himself and for them that
which he believes to be best. It is not
what some other man believes for him that
affects his life."
3
And again :
"There are two recognized ways of improv-
ing the quality of human beings: one by
giving them a better heredity start-
ing them in life by giving them a strong-
er heart, better digestion, steadier ner-
ves; the other by so combining the fac-
tors of daily life that even a weak heart
may grow strong, a poor digestion may be-
come good, and frayed nerves gain steadi-
ness.
The insight reflected in these quotations
Definition comes to crystalizatlon in the sociologi-
cal theory to which Miss Richards has ap-
1. Euthenics
, p. 14. 2. Ibid. pp. 18-20.
2. The Art of Right Living, p. 9.
cI
.5
given the name "Euthenics"
,
deriving it from the
1
G-reek of Demosthenes, Herodotus, and Aristotle • It
holds that race-improvement is largely a matter of per-
sonal control and that it can, accordingly, be best pro
moted by education in terms of Ideals. It concedes, as
at least one quotation has already shown, that "blood
tells" something but not everything and quite frequent-
ly a falsehood. It admits, too, that circumstances
"condition" but do not control the individual much
less determine the destiny of the person.
2
"It is true," Miss Richards concedes
,
that "man is a part of nature, subject to
nature's laws, but he has a power of con-
trol over himself and his natural environ-
ment, if only he will learn to use it,
greater far than over other living things,
for man has a spiritual nature capable of
high ideals for himself, ideals which make
self-control, foresight, and ambition pos-
sible; ideals which react on his bodily
condition, stimulating or inhibiting physi-
cal reactions. He has power to set for him-
self a goal to strive for, to ask ! What
shall I make of myself? 1 "
Accordingly euthenics is more than adjust-
ment, aspiration achievement. It is Promethe-
us fettered by brute strength (heredity) and blind
force (environment) to a "beetling precipice" on the
rim of the morning -land, yet asserting himself defi-
antly in the face of an unjust god —- "He cannot
1. Cf. Euthenics
, p. vii.
2. The Art of Right Living, pp. 16-17.
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Join death to a fate meant for me," It is Icarus led
by his father to a labyrinth from which escape seem-
ed impossible, yet using intelligence his own and
his father's to make wax-joined wings and fly on
them above the labyrinth, into the farthest blue. It
is Jesus asserting down the centuries: "And I, if I
be lifted up, shall draw all men unto me," It is a
soul, rooted in the soil, yet rising above it. It is
Robert Browning "I was ever a fighter, so one
fight more, the best and the last" and William
Ernest Henley, head high, shoulders back, eyes clear
and open-seeing "Invictus":
"Out of the night that covers me,
Black as the pit from pole to pole,
I thank whatever gods there be
For my unconquerable soul.
In the fell clutch of circumstance
I have not winced or cried aloud;
Beneath the bludgeoning s of chance
My head is bloody but unbowed.
Beyond this place of wrath and tears
Looms but the horror of the shade,
And yet the menace of t he years
Finds and shall find me unafraid.
It matters not how strait the gate
How charged with punishment the scroll:
I am the master of my fate;
I am the captain of my soul."
Euthenics is spiritual evolution achieving its goal,
personality immortality.
After such a transfiguration as that it is

necessary, as Peter learned on an even more rhapso-
dic occasion, to go down into the valley again. Tech-
nically rather than tabernacularly, euthenics is mo-
dified Weismannism, continuity in discontinuity ac-
cording to a Mendellan ratio and under G-alton 1 s law.
It acknowledges the potency of the germ-plasm and the
persistence of its unit -characters or chromosomes,
hut asserts further that these may be so conditioned
by somatic cells and circumstances as to release dor-
mant potentialities subsequently to be developed by
conscious endeavor, intelligence, ideals. It is,
then, in agreement with Thomson, as represented by
two quotations, already cited but so apropos here as
1
to warrant repetition :
"The changes which make for racial
progress are variations and mutations ari-
sing from within, from disturbances, rear-
rangements, permutations, and combinations
in the germ-cells from which new individu-
als arise."
"Ameliorations of nurture may serve
as the liberating stimuli that encourage
the unfolding of new variations of a use-
ful sort."
2
Euthenics is also Lamarckian in acknowledging the
transmission of acquired characteristics but by soci-
al, rather than individual, heredity, and even more
1, Outline of Science
, Vol. II, p. 375.
2. Ibid., Vol. II, p. 376.

surely through ideals.
Euthenics becomes, then, an acceptable
Criticism synthesis of eugenics and environmental
-
ism on a theoretical basis which con-
serves the validities but avoids the inconsistencies
in each of the other systems. This it achieves by
finding the reconciliation of the biological and the
sociological viewpoints in the psychological, as the
following chart shows:
BIOLOGICAL SOCIOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGICAL
Exponents Eugenists Environ-
mentalists
Euthenists
Primary
Concern
Seed
Nature
Soil —
Nutrition
Cultivation
- Nurture -
Process Animal
-
Husbandry
Conditioning Education
Determin-
ing Force
Instincts Institutions Intelligence
Thus does euthenics, properly
Implications understood and applied, resolve
for
Religious Education the perennial, millenial, con-
flict between heredity and en-
1
vironment and in the process suggest its implications
for Religious Education:
A, Heredity conditions Religious Education, be-
cause: 1.) Individually it transmits, through the
germ-plasm, the unit -characters which determine the
physical structure of the organism and, through pecu-
liar combinations of these unit-characters, the men-
tal capacities which, when developed, yield character;
2.) Socially, it transmits the stimuli to which this
physical organism must react and the conditions under
which these mental capacities must be developed to
yield character. And yet . ....
B. Heredity is at most only a device by which e-
volution achieves its end character, spirit, im-
mortality and not the dynamic which so relates the
individual to his environment as to enable him to tri-
umph over it and by such mastery of self and circum-
stances attain the highest development of which his or
ganism is capable. Accordingly •••••
G. Heredity must be supplemented by more dynamic
education such as will transmit and enrich not only na
tive but acquired characteristics and, so, add to the
capacities inherent in the germ-plasm the possiblli-

ties of permutations resident in the environment,
1
"The initiatives of moral character," says
Thomson, "are in some degree transmissible,
though from the nature of the case the in-
fluences of education, example, environment,
and the like, are more potent than in re-
gard to structural features."
2
D, Education capable of generating this dynamic
3
must perform, according to Dr. Athearn , a six-fold
function: 1.) Impart information; 2.) Form certain
habits; 3.) Increase certain powers; 4.) Discourage
certain tendencies; 5.) Arouse interests; 6.) In-
spire ideals .
E. Such education, emphasizing personal respon
sibility for character and the supreme worth of the
spirit, will be not only moral and religious but es
sentially Christian; for:
After all this solution of the problem is
4
not far different from that of the Sage who was ask-
ed what one must do "to inherit eternal life." It is
significant that He suggested certain things to be
done by the individual rather than certain other thing
1. Heredity, p. 469.
2. Cf. E. H. Richards, Euthenlcs
, p. ix: "Euthe-
nics is to be developed: 1.) Through sanitary science
2.) Through education; 3.) Through relating science
and education to life."
3. Lectures, Boston University, 1921-1922.
4. Cf. Mark 10:17 ff.
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already his by transmission from society and his
sires; indeed the "rich young man" was assured that
he could attain character, spirituality, immortality,
not so much through his inheritance as through a re-
pudiation of it or a proper disposition of it, indivi-
dual and social "G-o sell all thou hast and give
to the poor." He failed because he could not use his
bequest — "For he had great possessions" —- to a-
chieve a conquest, "eternal life."
Such advice left the Master in virtual a-
greement with "The Village Atheist," so-called, who,
1
in Edgar Lee Masters' s Spoon River Anthology , con-
fesses:
"Ye young debaters over the doctrine
Of the soul's immortality,
I, who lie here was the village atheist,
Talkative, contentious, versed in the ar-
guments of the infidels.
But through a long sickness
Coughing myself to death
I read the Upanlshads and the poetry of
Jesus.
And they lighted a torch of hope and intu-
ition
And desire which the Shadow,
Leading me swiftly through the caverns of
darkness,
Gould not extinguish.
Listen to me, ye who live in the senses
And think through the senses only:
Immortality is not a gift,
Immortality is an achievement;
And only those who strive mightily
Shall possess it."
1. Page 250
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"What, then, remains? Courage,
and patience, and simplicity, and
kindness, and, last of all, ideas re-
main; and these are the things to
lay hold of and to live with. 11
— A, C. Benson.
(
CHAPTER IV.
The PSYCHOLOGICAL SOURCES of RELIGIOUS
EDUCATION: IDEALS
In the argument of this dissertation thus
far, evolution has been found to be a valid method but
not a cause. Heredity has been examined and found in-
sufficient as an explanation of progress. Both inqui-
ries have forced the conclusion that the dynamic of
evolution and the necessary supplement of heredity, if
acquired as well as native characters are to be trans-
mitted, is education in terms of ideals. These are
not inherent in mechanical Nature, a biological endow-
ment as predictable as eclipses and Hapsburg chins;
nor are they inherited in either germ-plasm or insti-
tutions, however sociologically sound or socially re-
spectable; they are rather inspired and achieved by
psychological processes of infinite variation and per-
mutations. They are assimilated not appropriated;
forged, not filched; • and the hammer-b^ows that pro-
duce this handiwork are struck by Education.
"Not through chance," says Miss Ri-
chards, "but through Increase of scientific
knowledge; not through compulsion, but
through democratic idealism
,
consciously
working through common interests , will be
123
r
brought about the creation of right con-
ditions, the control of environment."
1
Nor is Miss Richards now so isolated in
Restatement her position as she was in 1911, when the
of the
Problem first enthusiasm for neo-realism was at
2
its height and religionists , as well as
mechanists were clamoring for a chance to uphold its
"platform." In McDougall's Character and Conduct , as
3
reviewed by "E.N." , the ego, revealed by a "practi-
cal psychology," is "not iron-bound within metes ri-
gidly imposed by nature but may to a certain extent re-
shape Itself and even cast off some of the inheritan-
ces that block its path to 'higher things.'" In fact
the book is offered
"to men and women of good will who are not
completely satisfied with themselves, and
who believe that by taking thought they may
add, however little, to their moral stature
and to their efficiency in working towards
whatever goals they may have adopted," since
"our Joys and sufferings are mainly of the
imagination, as anticipation or recollecti-
on, and over these functions we may exert a
very considerable control , the greater the
more we discipline ourselves."
Similarly, Irving Babbitt, although an avow-
ed opponent of Ideals, sentimentally considered, ad-
1. Euthenics
, p. vii.
2. Cf . a. A. Coe's "Virtue and Virtues," Reli-
gious Education, VI (1911), 486 ff.
3. Boston Evening Transcript, Dec. 24, 1927.
it
vocates both Miss Richards 1 s "democracy" and Dr. Mc
1
Dougall's "control," when he says :
"The desire of the constitutional de-
mocrat for Institutions that act as checks
on the immediate will of the people im-
plies a similar dualism in the individual
a higher self that acts restrlctively
on his ordinary and impulsive self. * *
"The crucial point in any case is
one's attitude toward the principle of con-
trol. Those who stand for this principle
in any form or degree are dismissed by the
emancipated as reactionaries or, still gra-
ver reproach, as Puritans. * * *
"Yet it remains true that awe and re-
verence and humility are Christian virtues
and that there was some survival of these
virtues in the Puritan, * * * In the pas-
sage from the love and fear of G-od of an
Edwards to the love and service of man pro-
fessed by the humanitarian, something has
plainly dropped out, something that is very
near the centre. What has tended to disap-
pear is the inner life with the special
type of control it imposes. With the de-
cline of this inner control there has been
an increasing resort to outer control,
# * # One is thus kept from perceiving the
real problem, which is to retain the inner
life, even though one refuse to accept the
theological nightmare with which the Puri-
tan associated it,"
With equal cogency and pungence, Charles
A, Bennett, protesting against what he calls "The
2
Cult of the Seamy Side," makes such "inner" or con
scious "control" normative for personality; thus
"At every point the psychologist
drives home the contrast between the pro-
1. "The Critic and American Life," The Forum,
Vol, LXXIX, No. 2, pp. 164-165.
2. Harper's Magazine, Vol. 156, Dec, 1927, pp.
1-10.
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feased motives of human conduct and the la-
tent motive, "between the overt and the con-
cealed springs of action. Moreover, since
he looks at the situation through the eyes
of the biologist or the physiologist, he
supports the cynic in the view that the con-
cealed motive is the real one. * * * And
so our cynic feels confirmed in his cynicism:
all human conduct has its seamy side, and
the seamy side is the real side. * * *
The realist, in his zeal for frankness, con-
demns the business of keeping up appearan-
ces because he takes it for granted that the
appearances are designed to conceal some-
thing discreditable. But they may just as
well stand for what we want to live up to.
* * 45- ideal claims need not argue hypocri-
sy if they are interpreted not as records
of achievement but as goals to be attained.
* * * I contend that our best foot is real-
ly our best foot, that the Old Adam is not
the true man. The true self is rather the
rational self of our ideal. When we adopt
the conventions of good manners we are try-
ing to behave a3 we believe a civilized hu-
man being ought to behave. What we aim at
that to some extent we are ."
1
Thus does current thought seem to be swing-
ing forward to what may be called an ideational deter
minism, under which ideals, as well as instincts, con
sciousness, as well as conditions, must be considered
valid springs of conduct, perhaps determinative, as
Vachel Lindsay insists in his splendidly biological
quatrains, "The Soul of a Spider" and "The Soul of a
2
Butterfly" :
1. "The Cult of the Seamy Side," pp. 6-8.
2. Collected Poems
, pp. 366-367.
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"The thing that eats the rotting stars
On the "black sea-beach of shame
Is a giant spider's deathless soul
And Mammon is its name."
"The thing that "breaks hell's prison-bars
And heals the sea of shame,
Is a fragile butterfly's great soul
And Beauty is its name,"
And the same idea comes to more personal il-
lustration, when such "Inner" "controls" or ideals are
found to be the redeeming remnant in the wrecked life
of "Mrs. Reece," as Edgar Lee Masters graphs and epi-
1
taphs her achievement curve in Spoon River Anthology :
"To this generation I would say:
Memorize some bit of verse of truth or beauty.
It may serve a turn in your life.
My husband had nothing to do with the fall
Of the bank he was only cashier.
The wreck was due to the President,
And his vain unscrupulous son.
Yet my husband was sent to prison,
And I was left with the children,
To feed and clothe and school them.
And I did it, and sent them forth
Into the world all clean and strong,
And all through the wisdom of Pope the poet:
'Act well your part,
'There all the honor lies.'"
As always, poetry is used, even as history,
for illustration not demonstration. It merely asks the
questions that science, psychology, and philosophy must
answer. Is there enough intelligence in the universe
to save "the rotting stars"? Is there sufficient pur-
pose behind behavior to enable one to "act well his
1. Page 92.
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part" and earn his unpredestlned "honor"? Can one
change nature, rise above Mammonistlc circumstances to
a realm of Beauty and Spirituality? Do ideals functi-
on, and, if so, how and to what end?
Most formulations of Religious Education
Definition realize the significance of ideals in its
"of
Ideal rationale and at least attempt a definl-
1
tion of the concept. Soares's reads :
"An ideal is an imaginary conduct model re-
presenting more than usual behavior and re-
quiring some effort to follow."
It is sound in making the ideal normative for charac-
terful behavior and in prescribing "effort" for its a-
chievement. But it does not suggest that the ideal
carries in itself the dynamic to initiate such stri-
ving. In this respect Charters represents progress o-
ver Soares by making an ideal "a trait which has become
2
the object of desire ." Voelker, using the definition
formulated by a faculty-committee at Teachers College,
combines the validities of the preceding statements
and makes a significant addition in the direction of
realization.
3
"An ideal," his definition reads, is pro-
bably best thought of as consisting of (I)
a generalized notion or general concept used
1. Religious Education
, p. 36.
2. The Teaching of Ideals , p. 33.
3. The Function of Ideals in Social Education
p. 4-7.
(i
as a plan or standard of action, (II) the
recognition and appreciation of the prac-
tical worth of this plan or standard, and
(III) a tendency (habit) to accept and o-
bey the plan or standard, to act it out in
conduct* Unless these three elements are
present, we cannot properly employ the term
ideal ."
This is progressive; also promising; but
1
it fails, as Dr. Brightman shows , to distinguish be-
tween acknowledged and adopted standards. According-
ly he not only asserts, but provides for, "a tendency
2
toward obedience
,
by making an ideal
"a general concept of a type of experience
which we approve in relation to a complete
view of all our experience, including all
our approvals, and which we acknowledge that
we ought to realize."
Brightman 1 s definition is further commenda-
ble in that starting with "a general concept" it sug-
gests the essentially ideational character of an i-
deal, which Dr. Athearn emphasizes in his definition
"An Ideal is an idea shot through with emo-
tion."
This definition, admirable as it is in its emphasis,
is admittedly inadequate unless one thinks of "idea"
4
in a Roycian sense :
"An idea is any state of consciousness whe-
it Philosophy of Ideals , pp. 67-68.
2. Ibid., p. B6.
3. Lectures, Boston University, 1921-1922.
4. Josiah Royce, The World and the Individual
,
p. 22.

ther simple or complex, which, when present,
is then and there viewed as at least the
partial expression or embodiment of a single
conscious purpose. It appears in conscious-
ness as having the significance of an act of
will."
1
Add to this Athearn' s "emotion" and an ideal becomes
2
1.) An image (sensory):
Cf. Roscoe Pound's address at Wheaton Col-
lege, October 15* 1927:
"Such an inquiry (into what we may rea-
sonably expect to do for civilization through
organized education) has to do, let us remem-
ber, with an element in the background of so-
cial control. In part this background is a
matter of habits or tendencies formed or ac-
quired in our formative years, and the sys-
tems which operate in the background have to
do with giving direction to them. But beyond
this a decisive factor in our efforts to main-
tain, further, and transmit, civilization is
to be found in Ideals , both generally receiv-
ed ideals and individual ideals, of social
life and social institutions and activities
as they should be. Let us use a more con-
crete word. In their origin 'idea' and ' i-
deal' mean ' picture * . Let us say picture.
Let us say that in what we do individually
and collectively we are guided sometimes con-
sciously and many times in large part uncon-
sciously by a mental picture, more or less
definite, of things as it seems to us they
ought to be .
"Take a case which the philosophers have
put from antiquity. The old time smith has
his tools and a piece of steel. Also he has
in mind the picture of a saw. He applies his
tool to the steel and fashions the steel to
the picture. Thus the picture is made real
in the completed saw. But we have a more
striking example in the present generation.
Icarus had in mind a picture of a man flying.
^ 1. Cf . the derivation of the term from the Greek
l^eL^ , "to see."
2. For a recent discussion of "Images" see Ber-
trand Russell, Philosophy, pp. 176-186; also Beatric
Edgell, Theories of Memory, pp. 135-150.

With wax and feathers he made himself
wings. The sun melted the wax and he came
to grief, as many aviators have done since.
But the picture has remained and has urged
men and guided their efforts until today it
has become a reality in aerial navigation."
plus .... 2.) A relation (rational):
This is quite frequently the thought that
the image may be related to the individual, that it re-
presents something that he "approves" and "ought" to
do.
plus .... 3.) A purpose (volitional):
1
Cf . Soares : "An ideal person is one
whose conduct seems better than that which
is common and who thereby summons us to mo-
ral effort."
plus .... 4.) A desire (emotional):
2
Cf . Soares : "Different from the group-
habit which is carried out as a matter of
course, the achievement of the ideal is a
conscious effort, involving, therefore, emo-
tion, which gives it added force."
both already partially fulfilled in their
5.) Reference to the act (motor), to which
the purpose points.
An ideal is then, as this analysis shows, an
urge toward an act of a whole self, the blue-print of a
value, an ideationally -motivated behavior pattern of
something
-that -ought -to-be.
3
Gf . Bennett : "Man is in this peculiar
1. Religious Education
, p. 36. 2. Ibid., p. 36.
3. "The Cult of the Seamy Side," p. 10.

position: before gratifying an impulse he
has to stop and think. He has to discover
what is involved in the proposed gratifica-
tion. He has to ask, 'Can I approve of my-
self, can I be at peace with myself if I do
this?' The conditions on which he will ac-
cept success have become more Important than
the success itself. And this is merely ano-
ther way of saying that the human being will
refuse to satisfy one side of his nature if
that involves doing violence to the legiti-
mate claims of the rest of his nature.
It was doubtless such a "control" as this
1
that H, G-. Wells had in mind when he wrote , "It is
not birth-rates that want raising, but Ideals," and
that William Blake raised in his poem, "Prom Milton":
"And did those feet in ancient time
Walk upon England 1 s mountains green?
And was the holy Lamb of God
On England* s pleasant pastures seen?
"And did the Countenance Divine
Shine forth upon our clouded hills?
And was Jerusalem builded here
Among these dark Satanic mills?
"Bring me my bow of burning gold!
Bring me my arrows of desire!
Bring me my spear, clouds, unfoldl
Bring me my chariot of fire!
"I will not cease from mental fight,
Nor shall my sword sleep in my hand,
Till we have built Jerusalem
In England's green and pleasant land'.'
Ima-
tic;
Rela -
tional ;
Emo -
tional
Voli -
tional ;
Motor.
It is one thing to define a concept and
quite another to demonstrate its validity against all
1. Mankind in the Making, quoted by Miss Richards,
The Art of Right Living, Titlepage.
It
detractors. The latter are led, in the matter of i-
deals, "by posltivistic behaviorists who say " "All of
this is metaphysics speculation." Has such an
emotionalized, volitionalized idea any psychological
grounding aside from a stimulative tremor in the spi-
nal cord or a mental flash without content for conduct?
Is it a force or a fiction? A dynamic or a delusion?
Properly defined and understood, Ideals
Psycholo- have their psychological grounding in:
gical
Grounding 1.) All the so-called "new" psychologies,
which conceive of mental processes as the
acts of a whole organism:
The new psychologies show conclusively
1
that the mind is much more complicated and purposive
than it was formerly considered and, above all, that
it functions through complex, organic units rather
than through single distinct reactions.
"There is no lobe in the brain," says Thom-
son, "that is the seat of intelligence. It
is the whole cortex, we might almost say the
whole nervous system, or the whole body that
is concerned in intelligence, not any single
region of it."
2
Similar assertions are made by the "new"
1. Cf. McDougall, "Men or Robots," Psychologies
of 1925, p. 305: Let us go on assuming that men are
what they seem to be, namely purposive
,
intelligent
agents, striving with some success to improve them-
selves and the conditions of their life."
2. Outline of Science
,
II, p. 543.
(
psychologists all the way from Koffka, the semi-per-
sonalist, to Kantor, the semi-behaviorist. The former
1
makes the idea "basic in the G-estalt -Psychology set
2
forth in The Growth of the Mind , while the latter
3
says in his Principles of Psychology :
"Since every reaction that we perform re-
presents some phase of operation of the
person, personality constitutes one of the
essential psychological data. Whatever we
consider as the actual fact to be studied
we must look upon it as an act of a person
or a psychological organism to some defi-
nite stimulus."
4
2.) Self -Psychology , which makes this
"whole organism" a self responsible for ideas and
functions
:
The classic citation here is, naturally,
5
Miss Calkins' s prescription :
"Psychology is most naturally, consistent-
ly, and effectively treated as a study of
conscious selves in relation to other
selves and to external objects in a
word to their environment personal and im-
personal."
The extent to which these selves are responsible for
the elements involved in an ideal is attested by these
1. Expounded also by Koehler, of whom McDougall
says ("Men or Robots," p. 304), "His endeavor is to
show that some physical phenomena express true tenden-
cies, that they tend toward certain ends."
2. New York, Hare ourt -Brae e , 1924.
3. New York, Knopf, 1924, p. 74. 4. Ibid,, p. 74.
5. A First Book in Psychology, p. vii.
O J
supplementary citations from the same source:
a. ) Ideas:
"I cannot be conscious of an Idea ex-
cept as an idea of a self; implicitly or
explicitly, I am always conscious of the
self as having the idea or experience. If,
therefore, I define psychology as science
of ideas, I raise the inevitable question,
Whose ideas?" Page 274.
b. ) Will:
"Will is consciousness of my active
connection with other selves or with
things, an egoistic, imperious relation,
a domineering mood, a sort of bullying at-
titude. In will I am actively, assertive-
ly related to my environment, I am consci-
ous of my superiority and independence of
it, I conceive of it as existing mainly
for my own use or gratification,"
c. ) Functions:
"A function, whether defined merely
as activity or as useful reaction to en-
vironment, is the function of a function
-
er, and there is no activity which is not
the activity of an actor. Therefore I sim-
ply cannot study mental functions without
at the same time studying the functioning
self."
3.) A limited Freudianism, which provides
the modus operandi for the emotionalization and vo-
litionalization of these "ideas" and "functions":
According to Thomson, Ideas get emotional-
ized and volitionalized through the operation of com-
plexes, in part instinctive and in part acquired.
1
"Complexes," he argues
,
"which directly
1. Outline of Science
,
II, P. 552.
c
center round a great primary instinct such
as sex are associated with a great fund of
emotional energy
This opens up the whole matter of complex-
psychology, the chief exponents of which have been
Freud, Jung, and Adler. They argued and popularized
their theories so successfully as to make them a ru-
ling passion among critical psychologists as well as
charlatans posing as such. Psychoanalysis was "the
green "bay tree" of psychology until behaviorism began
to hack away at its very roots, instincts. Here Mc
-
Dougall came to its support and with the help of
Koffka and Koehler, whose configurations have certain
affinities with complexes, saved those elements in
Freudianism which are valid for psychology and valua-
ble for Religious Education, Accordingly one may now
assert, without fear of compromising his academic
standing, that there are in mental experience certain
universal "drives" or "urges" "mental elements
associated together so as to form some more or less
2
loosely knit system" which make certain types of
behavior "objects of desire" in spite of "conditions"
that discourage them. These are, in the terminology
of psychoanalysis:
1. Thomson, Outline of Science, II, p. 552,
2. Ibid., P. 552.
c
a.) The ego-complex centering around the
Instinct for self-preservation, and giving rise to
escape-, defense-, and compensation-, mechanisms:
"These mechanisms , " says Everett
Dean Martin, "help men to keep their per-
sonality-pictures unbroken, 'to save their
self -valuations their souls' "
1 2
And Thomson, speaking of the whole complex, asserts :
"Among the great universal complexes
the ego -complex is the oldest and most pro-
found. This is the complex with which is
associated man's recognition of 'his self'.
This very powerful complex may give rise to
all sorts of unpleasant manifestations, to
various exhibitions of greed and of the de-
sire for self -aggrandisement ; but it also
gives rise to some of the most beneficent of
man's activities. Amongst these we may men-
tion the desire for construction, for the ma-
king of something which is a personal achie-
vement, whether it be a house, a poem, or a
system of philosophy."
b«) The sex-complex, centering around the
reproductive instinct:
This complex is given exaggerated impor-
tance at the present time but with fruitful results:
frankness in facing its increasingly complicated prob-
lems; and less unnatural asceticism in their solu-
tion.
c.) The herd-complex, centering around the
gregarious instinct:
This complex, too, has been overworked. It
1. The Mystery of Religion , New York, Harper's,
1924.
2. Outline of Science
, II, p. 552.
((
Is enough to add that it contributes motivation for
the socialization of the self; also psychological ba-
sis for Dr. Fosdlck's memorable epigram: "No man is
all of himself; his friends are the rest of him."
The outstanding error of Freudianism is its
exaggeration of the influence of the sex-complex to
the neglect of that of the more basic ego- and herd-,
complexes. Nevertheless it does establish the vali-
dity of controlling complexes or psychoses, which can
be handled in one of two ways: gratified; or written
among the impossibilities forgotten. Accepting
the Royce-Athearn definition of an ideal, one finds
that it is such a complex, such a psychosis, which,
unlike most of Freud's is a passion for good rather
than an irresistible impulse toward evil, or, as Dr.
1
Wayland Vaughan has shown , a superiority-, rather than
an inferiority-, complex. It is virtually the mental
2
state of which Dr. Athearn speaks when he says :
"The task of Religious Education is to build
up new associational complexes which will e-
ventually counteract the influence of earlier
vicious complexes."
Thus applying the gratify -or -forget theory still
further make an ideal unforgetable and you have
done all that can be done to insure its gratification,
its realization. Make it a dominant associational
1. The Lure of Superiority, New York, Holt, 1928.
2. Lectures, Boston University, 1921-1922.
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complex and you have made it a controlling factor in
character-formation. It takes a psychosis to correct
a psychosis, as Orpheus proved several centuries be-
fore Freud asserted it, when he safely passed the si-
rens, not by tying himself to the mast and sealing his
seamen's ears with wax the Odyssean way but
"by playing such haunting spirituals that his comrades
could not be lured to death by the tawdry jazz of the
sirens.
Such a psychology of Religious Education as
has been presented here by way of proving ideals nor-
mative for value-yielding experience, saves programs
grounded in it, on the one side from theological dual-
ism with all the monkish vagaries to which it gave
rise in the Middle Ages, and, on the other side, from
biological determinism of the sort that eventuates in
modern impulsivism. This is made more apparent in the
following chart, which also shows ideals to be the
psychological principle underlying personal responsi-
bility:
(See next page.)
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IDEALS Seen as A SYNTHESIS
THEOLOGICAL BIOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGICAL
Dualism
Self -Denial
Asceticism
Soul -Psychology
A duty -ethics
Deism
Catholicism
Institutional
Responsibility
"Extra Ec-
clesiam nulla
salus."
Impulslvism
Self-indulgence
Hedonism
I
I Behaviorism
I
I A goods -ethics
Atheism or Pan-
theism
Humanism
Social Respon-
sibility
"The woman
tempted me and
I ate."
Idealism
Self -Realization
Perfectionism
Self -Psychology
A value-ethics
Theism
Christianity
Personal Respon-
sibility
"'whatsoever a
man soweth he
shall reap."
it
,L.
Since this dissertation deals primarily
with the "presuppositions" and "sources" of Religious
Education, it will not discuss at length the acquisi-
tion and operation of ideals, which are, obviously,
matters of "methods" and "products". But it will out-
line these processes by way of testing their "sources"
and validating the "presuppositions" of which they are
the logical culmination.

1
"Ideals arise," says Dr. Athearn
,
"in
Acquisition response to that craving for coherency
in life Inherent in all rational beings."
This, in turn, may be referred to the fact that "expe-
rience and nature are, in a sense," as Dr. Brightman
2
conjectures
,
"actually ideal systems, deriving their
meaning and even their very existence from their embo-
diment of ideals." His subsequent argument translates
the conjecture into a conviction and makes his book,
A Philosophy of Ideals , the classic treatment of the
subject for Religious Educators.
More specifically, in keeping with the ana-
lysis of an ideal already made:
1. ) The imagistic element is derived from
experience, notably: a.) Observation; b.) Books;
c.) Pictures; d.) Music; e.) Drama.
2. ) The rational element is to be referred
to reason in the Hegelian sense, which sees life whole
and appreciates its inter-relations.
3. ) The emotional element has two sources:
a.) The universal complexes already discussed; b.)
Associations with persons, whose approval, for various
reasons, is desirable.
1. Lectures, Boston University, 1921-1922.
2. A Philosophy of Ideals
, p. v.

4.) The volitional element is the natural
extension of the emotional, since the desire intuitive-
ly fathers the purpose; and yet the transition from
feeling to will is frequently made more certain by
supplementary sanctions, an authority the Church,
the law, parents, teachers, one's moral rather than
impulsive self.
Here, again, there is danger of mistaking
Operation an acknowledged standard for a working i-
deal, which is materially as well as for-
mally real. Character comes not only from what one
purposes and believes, but more surely from what one
achieves. Principles must be projected from the mental
and the emotional into the motor if they are to be con-
trolling factors in character-building.
"I strove," said Pestalozzi, "to develop
the feeling of each virtue before I talked about it."
The transfer here was from the mental to
the emotional or, from another viewpoint vice-versa.
It was progress but it fell short of reality which is
not thinking or feeling but acting. The ideal, to be
realized, must be expressed in action, must be made mo-
tor.
Dr. Paul F. Voelker states the problem ad-
mirably in his record of an actual project, The Func -
((
1
tlon of Ideals In Social Education :
"If it "be granted, as Thomdike says,
that the one thing education can do best
Is to establish those particular connecti-
ons with ideas which we call knowledge, and
those particular connections with acts
which we call habits, 1 is it also possible
for education to establish connections with
those general ideas which we call ideals
and with those general habits which we call
attitudes; and can it establish these con-
nections in so vital a way that the ideals
and attitudes will serve in the control of
conduct? Unless it is possible to prove
that such connections can be made and that
they perform a vital function in directing
the current of human life, it will be use-
less to build programs for moral, religious,
and civic education. On the other hand, if
it can be shown that there is a possibility
of transfer of training from the school to
the moral, civic, and religious life of the
outside world, the importance of inculcat-
ing proper ideals will be recognized, and
broad programs of social education may con-
fidently be undertaken."
It is noteworthy that this confidence is
justified only if certain questions can be satisfac-
torily answered, viz.: Do ideals function and, if
so, how and why? Having been acquired, can they be
used to achieve ends, to do work, to realize progres
sively higher values? Do they remain "evanescent ab
stractions" or can they be translated into behavior
concrete enough to be intrinsically as well as in-
strumentally worthful?
1. New York, Teachers College, Columbia Univer-
sity Press, 1921, p. 4-6.
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Answers favorable to the operation of ideals
are warranted here not only because psychotropic evo-
lution and euthenics indicate such an ideational con-
trol in experience but also because the various ele-
ments comprising an ideal can be made to function in
an organic combination which will promote, if not in-
sure, the realization of the ideal. Thus:
A, The imagistic and relational elements can be
made operative through rational imitation or assimi-
lation:
Psychologically imitation is a peripheral
Imitation stimulus returning upon itself. Variations
in the stimulus produce, as J. Mark Baldwin
1
shows
,
two types of reaction: a.) "If the stimulus
comes directly from the sense and passes out into
conduct without a definite consciousness of the pat-
tern which is being imitated, the reaction is uncon-
scious imitation or sensori-motor suggestion;" b.)
"If the stimulus rises from a realization of the
worth of the pattern so that the Imitator proceeds
consciously and deliberately to make it his pattern,
the reaction is conscious imitation or ideo-motor sug-
gestion. "
1. Quoted by Athearn, Lectures, 1921-1922.
tt
Physiologically, imitation is excitability
(sensory) becoming contractability (motor or muscu-
lar). Response to a stimulus is a mechanical neces-
sity. The excitement of the sensation releases ener-
gy which requires an outlet. If this energy is used
to run away from the impulse the reaction is inhibi-
tion; if it is used to express the impulse in terms
of the stimulus it is imitation.
Metaphysically, in the light of the nature
of a person, set forth in Chapter I of this disser-
tation, imitation is the complex becoming centered,
a process by which the non-self is so assimilated as
1
to become a part of the self .
Thus are the "general concepts" of Dr.
Brightman 1 s "ideals" and the "imaginary conduct mo-
dels" of Soares's formulation so related to the per-
son imaging them as to evoke "approval" and initiate
"effort" in the direction of realization.
Manifestly an agency so dynamic as this
should be utilized for Religious Education. It is
instinctive ; hence the necessity for regulation so
that only good models will be imitated. It becomes
rational, psychotropically and euthenically intelli -
1. Cf. Wordsworth's "Three Years She G-rew" ; al-
so Don Marquis's "The Paradox," Braithwaite' s Antholo-
gy of Magazine Verse, 1915, p. 150.
Ic
gent, however, when the reaction to stimulus in-
volves a preferential functioning such as necessitates
a choice between models and represents action on con-
cepts and precepts rather than on mere behavioristic
percepts. It is eventually personal
,
and, so, charac-
terful, if the reaction is not sensori-motor but ideo-
motor, if it is, more than the reproduction of ano-
ther self (conscious or unconscious imitation), the
expression of one's self (definitely conscious assi-
milation) •
More specifically, the function of imitati-
on in Religious as well as secular Education is: 1.)
To permit the transmission of acquired characters be-
fore the age of educability; 2.) To promote social
heredity; 3.) To stimulate invention; 4.) To uti-
lize prestige for progress. Apropos of the latter,
as well as of the instinctive character of imitation
1
Miss Richards observes :
"When an idea has won in a certain circle,
it quickly spreads to the other members,
thence to active communities. So the uni-
versal law of imitation may be the great-
est help in the spread of ideas. The in-
dividual eats a certain food because his
neighbor does. Boston determines to make
an effort for a better city because Chica-
go has felt the stirrings of civic pride,
A gifted individual with a deep sense of
1. Euthenics
, pp. 17-18
(
the need of his community sees an ideal
condition, which, "by his thought, "becomes
a possibility. These beliefs he shares
with a few choice spirits till the circle
has widened. The new ideas come to the no-
tice of the city or the town officials, new
means are adopted of educating the whole
community, and, if necessary, legal mea-
sures are passed. But the new means to
betterment must be applied by the indivi-
dual. Beginning with the exceptional indi-
vidual and ending with the average indivi-
dual, the perfect circle is rounded out."
That is to say, an idea, so emotionalized as to be-
come an ideal, may, through imitation of the image
involved be related to the whole complex, which is a
person, and, by the same process, to other persons
or complexes until it has become socially as well as
personally operative in such a way as to realize the
higher values comprising character.
Despite the dangers of imitation the
1 2
loss of self in other selves or society and the
development of patterns instead of persons its
significance for Religious Education can hardly be
exaggerated. Moreover, if critical imitation is the
most effective method in early education, and if the
more perfect "models" yield, through imitation, the
higher character values, children should be taught as
1. Cf . Johan Bojer, The Prisoner Who Sang, New
York, The Century Co., 1924.
2. ) Cf. Wordsworth's "Ode on the Intimations of
Immortality": "Shades of t he prison-house close a-
round the growing boy."
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soon as possible to imitate the Master-model, Jesus.
This is essentially Canon Raven's conten-
tion in a book which is of incalculable significance
1
for Religious Education, A Wanderer 1 s Way . In a
chapter dealing with the hero-worship stage in his own
life, the time at which the imitative instinct is
2
strongest, he says :
"I fell in love first with Julius
Caesar, or rather with Warde Fowler's por-
trait of him; and then for a little time
with Hannibal; and then with Hector, the
Hector of the great parting with Androma-
che; and only at intervals felt a bashful
admiration for some hero of the school-
world.
"This, then, is the time when Jesus,
the great adventurer, Jesus, the perfect
example of fortitude, Jesus, the lord of
all good life ought to be given to us.
* * # He is so plainly the hero that I
wanted, the hero who was not merely strong
but sensitive and sympathetic, brave and
yet tragic, lonely and wholly lovable. If
only he had been as real as Caesar; if
only I had known His story as I knew the
Iliad; * * * then the passion pent up in
me would have found its object; my af-
fection and my mind would have been His:
I should have been given the friend that I
was seeking."
B. The emotional element can be made ldealisti
cally operative through the education and redirec-
tion of impulses:
1. New York, Holt, 1929.
2. A Wanderer'
s
Way, pp. 38-39.

As the discussion of imitation has shown,
Education an ideal, to become a value controlling
of the
Emotions conduct, must be transferred from the mind
to the muscles. This transfer is effect-
ed physiologically by the nervous system and psycho-
logically by the emotions. Accordingly their educa-
tion is essential to the successful operation of i-
deals.
The pedagogical soundness of such a posi-
tion is indicated by the fact that educators every-
where are following the lead of Dr. Jeremiah Burke,
Superintendent of t he Boston Public Schools, who, in
his Annual Report to the Boston School Committee for
1
1926 said :
"Several years ago school men were
accustomed to repeat the slogan, 1 Send the
whole child to school. 1 It was excellent
pedagogy. They repeatedly pointed out that
the sharpening of the intellect without at
the same time wisely developing the spirit-
ual emotions tended to produce cunning
knaves and rascals to become a perpetual
menace to society. * * *
"In times of stress and storm the
intellect deserts us and the emotions as-
sume control. The emotions should not be
repressed; rather they should be trained,
directed, cultivated and made to serve
their lofty purposes. They should be do-
minated by the will, which, in turn, should
be subservient to conscience.
1. Reprinted in the Boston Herald and the Bos
ton Evening Transcript for Dec. 17, 1926.

"It may be interesting to know that
the superintendent has appointed a council
of teachers representing the various types
of schools and grades of instruction, to
make an exhaustive scientific study and to
submit in due season a report on the educa-
billty of the emotions. * * * May we not
expectantly look forward to the time when,
as the result of education, the emotional
nature of our people, ceasing to be the
plaything of the charlatan and the dema-
gogue, chastened and refined, will repel
whatever is vicious and unlovely, and, like
the heliotrope following the sun will re-
spond obediently to everything that is
pure, holy, and sublime.
The physiological basis for a project so
ambitious and so religious as this is to be found in
the structure and functioning of the nervous system.
Under its operation emotional reactions involve two
processes: impression and expression with cortical
activity receiving the one and emitting the other.
Nervous tissue is made up of neurons of three orders:
1.) Sensory, consisting of a nucleus and two axons
and terminating in end arborizations; 2.) Associative,
consisting of a nucleus, short branching axons, and
numerous dendrites; 3») Motor, consisting of a nucle-
us, several dendrites, and an axon connecting with
muscular tissue. Contacts between end-arborizations
and dendrites, such as establish connections between
neurons of different orders, are called synapses. The
cortex of the brain, containing the most associative
«
neurons, is, accordingly, the most synaptic part of
the nervous system. Sensory neurons comprise afferent
nerves, which are the media of impression; motor neu-
rons comprise efferent nerves which are the media of
expression; associative neurons, and especially those
in the cortex of the cerebrum, mediate the transition
from impression to expression.
As Dr. H. Newell Martin, D.Sc, M.A., M.D.,
1
F.R.S., points out , the associative neurons of the
cortex not only mediate but may modify the reaction
along the efferent nerve to the stimulus received from
the afferent nerve, so that a sensory call does not
necessarily evoke the same motor reply. This means
that cortical action, consciousness, may so direct and
modify reactions as to control conduct and provide a
physiological basis for Dr. Athearn 1 s task of Religi-
ous Education "to build up new associational
complexes which will eventually counteract the influ-
ence of earlier vicious complexes."
It is at this point that ideals function
in the education of the emotions. Cortical action
2
is, according to Dr. Martin
,
largely a matter of
1. The Human Body, New York, Holt, 1917, pp.
138-139.
2. Ibid., pp. 181-191.
(I
1
"associative memory" operating through "concepts"
.
Ideals with their images and relations furnish the
"memory -pictures" or behavior-patterns, which modify
reactions in such a way as to produce rational con-
duct and moral character; for cells where "related
sense-impressions" are stored the authority is a-
2
gain Dr. Martin build from these "a composite
which is stored in turn as a memory. As additional
related information is gained, the composite, or con-
cept, is enlarged. * * * "Since concepts are stored
as memories they may serve in their turn
as bases for more complex associations;
these again by becoming memories may con-
tribute to the associative process, and,
so, the complex structure of the mind is
built up."
Practical demonstration of such a redirec-
tion of impulses under the stimulation of ideals, is
found in the successful project, described and evalu-
ated by Voelker, in the book already mentioned, The
Function of Ideals and Attitudes in Social Education.
Its thesis may be reduced to three essential tenets:
1.) The emotional dynamic of desires, impulses,
3
drives, "the hormic principle," as McDougall calls it,
should be developed and directed rather than discard-
ed; 2.) This can be accomplished by the dissociation
1. The Human Body, p. 182.
2. TbTd.
, p. TBI ff.
3. Cf . McDougall, Outline of Psychology, pp. 72-
73.

and reassociation of stimuli and responses; 3.) I-
deals may be the new stimuli to which old responses
are attached without the loss of their original dy-
namic
.
Voelker's most succinct statement of his
thesis is found on Page 51:
"The first step in the solution of the
problem of the function of ideals and atti-
tudes, is to determine how the great emoti-
onal drives may be brought under control;
how safety valves may be provided so that
certain undesirable drives may 'blow off
steam 1 without setting in motion any of the
preparatory and consummatory machinery; and
how other drives may be detached from the
objects that originally stimulate them to
reaction and become attached with their ap-
propriate responses to other and often vast-
ly different objects."
The experimental data and interpretations
which comprise the rest of the book prove this con-
tention so conclusively that Voelker was awarded a
doctor's degree from Columbia University for his
work on the project and his record of it as set forth
in these statistics. So clearly does his argument in
dicate that the emotional dynamic of impulses and in-
stincts centering around primary complexes can be so
controlled, directed and redirected by ideals, as to
make it a force producing rather than preventing high
moral character, that he seems justified in the posi-
1
tive-ness with which he asserts :
1. Pages 125-126.
(
"Civic, moral and religious education
will need to emphasize the inculcation of
right ideals. Without such ideals all so-
cial education will drop to the level of
trick-training. These ideals must "be so
reinforced by means of emotional experien-
ces that they will be able to inhibit the
response of habits that are contrary to
their purpose, and to regulate the response
of habits which are in harmony with their
purpose. With faith in the function of
these ideals and of the attitudes which are
generated by them, it will be possible to
build broad and comprehensive programs of
social education."
C. The volitional element can be made operative
through the positive pull of loyalties and values;
Rational imitation provides a wide va-
Motlvatlon riety of models for moral conduct. A J
of the
Will dicious education of the emotions trans
fers the action which these models sug-
gest from the mind to the muscles. Even so the ac-
tion is not significant for character, is not moral
until it becomes purposive, a conscious striving to-
ward a desired end. However rational the imitation,
however dynamic the emotion, ideals are not truly o-
peratlve until they involve a will that chooses the
better model or the more ethical response, such as
will make the deeper desire yield the higher value.
This is a matter not of drive but of draw , the posi -
tive pull of loyalties
,
values
, persons When
r
the lure is gone, life loses its loveliness.
1
Voelker says it more critically :
"The driving power of an ideal can "be
explained in terms of natural laws, and es-
pecially of the law of effect. * * * The
"boy who learns to play fair in a game in-
stead of taking unfair advantage does so
because he finds greater shame in being
dishonorable than in being defeated, or be-
cause he finds greater satisfaction in the
consciousness of being honorable than in
the hope of victory. The ideal which he has
set for himself is his standard of conduct,
and to fall below his standard would give
him greater annoyance than any other pain
could give; for it would mean failure in
the realization of himself. * * * An unre-
alized ideal is a want, a need, the fail-
ure to satisfy which arouses a feeling of
irritation and annoyance and acts as a
powerful consummatory drive. * * * It
is doubly under the influence of the law of
effect, then; for it is not only driven
by annoyance of the present and the past,
but is also drawn by anticipation of the fu-
ture"^
The development of this positive pull is,
again, a matter of "methods" and "products", but it is
significant for the "sources" of Religious Education
that they suggest goals which are pedagogically and
2
psychologically attainable.
Ideals thus become not only an integrating
factor in personality, but, beyond that, as Dr.
1. The Function of Ideals and Attitudes in So-
cial Education
, pp. 55-56*1
2. For further elaboration of theories of loyal-
ties and values, see Royce, The Philosophy of Loyalty,
and Everett, Moral Values.

1
Brightman proves , a constituent element In reality
so normative as to be a valid psychological source of
Religious Education, because:
1.) They make life a progress
-
Implications ive realization of ends such as
for
Religious Education explains the upward urge of e-
volution;
2. ) They provide for the transmission of
acquired characters and moral tendencies, for which
heredity furnishes, at best, only a doubtful predispo-
sition;
3. ) They drive one dialectlcally to the
deepest desire, G-od, which yields, in turn, the high-
est value, moral and religious a free spirit.
And so it happens that education in terms
of Ideals is what Augustine was pleading for when he
said, "Thou hast made us for Thyself and our hearts
are r estless until they find rest in Thee;" what
2
Francis Thompson realized when he wrote
,
"I fled Him down the nights and down the
days "
and later, when, at the end of "that long pursuit," he
had surrendered himself to "this tremendous lover,"
"Is my gloom, after all, shade of His hand,
Outstretched caressingly?"
1. A Philosophy of Ideals .
2. ""The Hound of Heaven".

and what Katharine Lee Bates was extolling in her ve-
1
ry great poem, "The Ideal" :
"By the promise of noon 1 s "blue splendor in the dawn'
s
first silvery gleam
By the song of the sea that compelleth the path of
the rock-cleaving stream,
I summon thee, recreant dreamer, to rise and follow
thy dream.
"In the inmost core of thy "being I am a burning fire,
From thine own altar -flame kindled in the hour when
souls aspire,
For know that men* s prayers shall "be answered, and
guard thy spirit's desire.
"That which thou wouldst be thou must be, that which
thou shalt be thou art;
As the oak astir in the acorn, the dull earth rend-
eth apart,
Lo, thou, the seed of thy longing, that breaketh and
waketh the heart.
"I am the cry of the night wind, startling thy trai-
torous sleep;
Moaning I echo thy music, and e'en while thou boast-
est to reap
Alien harvests, my anger resounds from the vehement
deep.
"I am the solitude folding thy soul in a sudden em-
brace.
Faint waxes the voice of thy fellow, wan the light
on his face;
Life is as cloud-drift about thee, alone in shelter-
less space.
"I am the drawn sword barring the lanes thy mutinous
feet
Vainly covet for greenness. Loitering pace or fleet,
Thine is the crag -path chosen. On the crest shall
rest be sweet.
"I am thy strong consoler, when the desolate human
pain
Darkens upon thee, the azure outblotted by rush of
the rain.
1. America the Beautiful and Other Poems, p. 59.

"All thou dost cherish may perish; still shall thy
quest remain,
"Call me thy foe in thy passion; claim me in peace
for thy friend;
Yet bethink thee by lowland and upland, wherever thou
wiliest to wend,
I am thine angel of judgment; mine eyes must thou
meet in the end."
The extent to which the ideal carried by
this poem functioned to produce values is revealed by
a letter which Miss Bates received in 1890. It was
written by a young medical student at Harvard and read
in part:
"Your poem, 'The Ideal, 1 has come to occu-
py such a place in my life that I have for
some time wanted to thank you for it, to
try to make you feel how it comes home to
all the thinking and feeling of one who
knows nothing of you and has no reason ex-
cept the intrinsic worth of the poem for
feeling deeply thankful that it exists. B-
very line in it is an experience of mine or
has helped to create one, * * * * I would
to God I could bring to you the happiness
that would surely come with the sense of
having done such a service to the world as
your poem has done."
The letter was signed: "Gratefully and sincerely
yours Richard C. Cabot."
It is further revealing to know that Dr.
Cabot eventually wrote his philosophy of ideals into
1
a book called What Men Live By "Work, Play, Love,
and Worship" the quintessential disciplines of
Religious Education.
1. Boston, Houghton-Mifflin, 1914 and 1924.

"The powers that make us per-
sonalities with capacities of thought,
purpose, and love, are not the fortu-
itous concourse of self -organizing
matter, but the revelation of an eter-
nal spirit: that we have a divine he-
ritage, a divine nature, and a divine
possibility."
Harry Emerson Fosdick.
ct
CHAPTER V.
SUMMARY and CONCLUSIONS: TREND
and VALUE of RELIGIOUS
EDUCATION
Recently Professor Albert E. Einstein wrote
a pamphlet so thin, but withal so deep as to arouse
more popular and critical interest than any similar
paper since Kant's "Dissertation of 1770." In it he
argued mathematically and metaphysically for an under-
lying relation between gravitation and electricity,
implying a more dynamic Something than either of these,
its physical and astrophysical manifestations. Subse-
quently Professor Einstein identified that Something
with a Someone, not improperly referred to as God.
"Ich glaube," he cabled, in response
to Rabbi Herbert Goldstein' s query, "Do
you believe in God," "an Spinosas Gott,
der Sich in gesetzlicher Harmonie des Sei-
ender offenbart, nicht an Gott der Sich
mit Schicksalen und Handlungen der Mensch-
en abgibt."
1
Similarly, if not so briefly or so cogent-
ly Miserere, Dominel this dissertation argues
1. Einstein does not reason so accurately here
as he does in demonstrating his theory of relativity;
for the God "who reveals Himself in the orderly har-
mony of Being," is hardly to be dissociated from the
"fates" and "affairs" of other selves, who are, ob-
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for a relation "between ideals and experience such
as makes them a force which draws ( Einstein's "gra-
vitation" and Otto's "fasclnosum") and drives ( Ein-
stein's "electricity" and Otto's "mysterlum tremen-
dum") through experience to the higher values which
lie "behind and beyond them and make them normative for
character. Thus, a thing is true not because it works
but it works because a truth is coming to expression
through it. A project does not produce character; it
merely reveals character through activities congenial
to its realization. Conduct is meaningless apart
from a content which gives it direction and a dynamic
which makes its method work. Both of these are to be
found in an ideal-motivated intelligence such as
makes the Macrocosm and its co-operating microcosms
1
self -realizing organisms •
Religious Education, as defined in Chapter
Summary I, is "G-od in experience molding character"
through ideals (See Chapters II, III, and
IV), which, when realized, become moral values. It
viously part of that "harmony" unless they choose
not to be; in which case their acts are to be re-
ferred to a freedom that is evidence of a G-od, Who is
concerned enough about men to allow them initiative
without impairing His order in the realm of Being.
1. Cf
.
Bower, The Curriculum of Religious Edu -
cation
,
New York, Scribner's, 1925, p. 35: "in this
(<
is not, as so many "practical -minded" critics con-
tend, a lot of things that ought to "be but are not;
it is rather things that are, which, because they are
what they are, carry with them an aura of oughtness
which makes them normative for minds capable of appre-
view, the centre of education has shifted completely
from the learning process and subject-matter to per-
sons (the italics are Bower's)." * * * "It sees per-
sonality as the dynamic and organizing centre of a
continuum of experience that is constantly undergo-
ing reconstruction as it moves forward with increas-
ing clearness and richness of meaning and certainty of
control toward the progressive realization of a set of
organized values. For this reason it sees self-reali-
zation taking place in and through a meaningful, in-
tegrated, and controlled experience." Cf. also Ibid.,
p. 39: "The ultimate criterion by which every insti-
tution and process, be it industrial, political, soci-
al, or religious, must be Judged is its effect upon
the self-realization of persons. Consequently, the
philosophy that will furnish the Intellectual support
of democracy as a form of associated living will be a
philosophy that will start from a centre of persons
and purposes rather than mechanisms and will think its
way through all peripheral problems in the light of
these values."
Bower' s position here is one of the most
interesting things disclosed by the research study
for this dissertation. Philosophically he is a prag-
matist, an avowed disciple of William James and to
some extent of John B. Watson. And yet, in arriving
at a psychology of Religious Education he reaches 1-
dentically that of this dissertation, as the follow-
ing quotation shows (Page 46):
"A more recent tendency (which Bower ap-
proves) has been a movement in the direction of in-
terpreting behavior in terms of purpose, conscious-
ness, reflective thought, and deliberate choice.
From this viewpoint, all behavior is seen as funda-
mentally conative; that is, as moving toward ends
through an act of impulse or will. * * * On the
higher levels of behavior there occurs a delay between
I
elating and assimilating them. Religious Education
says, not, the universe ought to "be friendly; there-
fore it is; but rather, observation shows that the
universe _is friendly; therefore, since this spirit
or ideal is in it, experiences rising out of it will
yield values. It says, not, you ought to be this or
that kind of person, as dogmatic assumptions may dic-
tate, but you are this or that kind of person with
possibilities of Improving yourself in various ways;
therefore, experience, under intelligent direction,
the situation and the response which is filled with
consciousness, reflective thought, the criticism of
ends and means, evaluation, deliberate choice, and
the exercise of a determining will. As contrasted
with mechanistic behaviorism, this view is decidedly
a purposive behaviorism."
Until reading this passage, the writer of
this dissertation was under the impression that the
idea, and especially the term "purposive behavior-
ism", was original with him. Certainly he arrived at
the phraseology, as well as the theory, independently
of Bower.
It makes one wonder about the fixity of
the alleged "great gulf" between the Chicago School
and the Boston School, between pragmatism and person
-
alism in Religious Education. Both, translated from
logic into life (Bowne would approve that), argue for
ideals capable of realization in activity (James would
approve that)
.
It makes one feel that James, dogmatically
or undogmatically , was barking up the right tree,
when he wrote in a letter to Bowne (See Knudson 1 s
The Philosophy of Personallsm
, pp. 405-406)
:
"""it seems to me that you and I are now aim-
ing at exactly the same end, though, owing to our
different past, from which each retains verbal ha-
bits, we often express ourselves so differently. It
(
1
and control, "inner" rather than outer, ought to
yield the values implicit in the complex of emotion-
alized ideas which is that kind of a person. The va-
lue achieved is dependent upon the idea behind it ra-
ther than exclusively upon the experience through
which that idea comes to expression; content as well
2
as conduct
,
subject-matter as well as method, prin-
ciples even more surely than projects, contribute to
the essentially conscious process by which individu-
ality-in-sociality, i.e. personality is achieved.
The dissertation leads, then , to ideational
determinism , in universal as well as Individual expe-
rience , and especially in experiences calculated to
yield moral and religious values ; thus:
seemed to me over and over again that you were plant-
ing your feet identically in footprints which my feet
were accustomed to quite independently, of course,
of my example, which was what made the coincidences so
gratifying."
1. Cf . Irving Babbitt, "The Critic and American
Life," The Forum, LXXIX, No. 2, (Feb., 1928), pp. 161-
176.
2. In fact, content and conduct may be antithe-
tical as they sometimes are in wars; in which case
the value is realized not so much through the experi-
ence as in spite of it. Cf. Carl Sandburg's "The
Four Brothers," Cornhuskers
, p. 147: "Out of it all a
G-od who sees and pierces through, Out of it all a G-od
who knows is sweeping clean." Cf. also Alan Sullivan's
"Prospice," A Book of Verse of the Great War
, p. 150:
"Again the Savage greets the sun, Again his feet with
fury shod, Across a world in anguish run; But af-
ter all the anguish G-od."
((
Chapter I shows how the current conflict
Presup- between discipline and impulse, Intellect
positions and intuition, demands an inquiry into
the nature of reality, which in turn in-
dicates that:
1. ) The data of metaphysics, ethics, theo-
logy* sociology, pedagogy, and psychology, synoptical
ly seen and consistently interpreted, establish the
organic wholeness of experience, both universal and
individual;
2. ) This implies such a relation between
the Macrocosm and the microcosm as Religious Educa-
tion seeks to reveal and make more effectually opera-
tive through experiences that will translate indivi-
dual desires into universal values, on the assumption
warranted in the light of presuppositions already es-
tablished, that religion is not superimposed on the
natural; It is normative for it.
Chapter II demonstrates the truth of this
Sources fact on biological grounds by showing that:
1.) The evidence for evolution is so con-
vincing as to force the conclusion that such a prin -
ciple of gradual growth toward individuation is ope-
(
rative in the universe and responsible for its pro-
gress;
2. ) Darwinian and Spencerian interpreta-
tions of this evidence consider only the biological
factors involved in evolution and, so, merely de-
scribe the way it operates without explaining why;
3. ) Bergson, Morgan, Mathews, and Noble,
more comprehensively, discover psychological factors
immanent in, and normative for, the process; taken
together, their theories provide a psychotropic ex-
planation of evolution, which makes active mind or
intelligence an idea expressing itself, an ideal
coming to realization the dynamic driving it to-
ward its goal, immortality.
Chapter III shows how this universal in-
telligence, becoming individual, carries the solution
of the major dilenma of present-day sociology, since:
1. ) Only qualities dependent upon physical
structure or, at most, mental capacity, can be re-
ferred to heredity; hence the futility of eugenics
as a final determinant of character;
2. ) A thorough-going environmentalism is
(! t
equally invalid because it takes no account of struc-
tural or cerebral characters transmitted by heredity;
3.) A valid synthesis for this antithesis
is found in euthenics, "the science of a controlled
environment," in which the principle of control is
intelligence
,
functioning through ideals .
Chapter IV so defines and analyzes "ideals"
as to justify the assumption that they carry the dy-
namic attributed to them by euthenics, viz.:
1. ) Imagistic and relational factors ope-
rating through instruction and imitation;
2. ) An affective tone, which can be made
controlling through a proper education of the emoti-
ons;
3. ) A stimulus to the will, a response to
which is promoted by: a.) The aura of oughtness im-
plicit in the ideal; b.) The loyalties evoked by its
Imagistic and emotional elements; c.) The values re-
presented by its realization.
An ideal is, then, an idea or principle,
functioning through a proj ect , to realize values im-
plicit in the organic wholeness of persons, viewed as
r
parts of a larger configuration or whole, the uni-
verse.
Chapter V, drawing conclusions from these
Emphases premises, shows that character is not the
1
"by-product" of conduct; rather is it the
cause of the kind of conduct through which the real
1. This is the major fallacy invalidating much
that is admirable in Erwin L. Shaver's Present -Day
Trends in Religious Education . "Character thus be-
comes," he says (Page 28), "not something to be prig-
gishly sought for in Pharisaic manner, but a whole-
some and unconscious 'by-product' as Jesus meant it to
be." His subsequent "demonstration" of Jesus' s use
of the project method (Page 47) is hollow and uncon-
vincing. Jesus' s method for teaching, the parable,
is much nearer ideals, emotionalized ideas urging va-
lue-producing conduct, than "projects" however ambi-
tious or religious. As for the extent to which Jesus
made the purposive, conscious factor in conduct nor-
mative for character, see Matthew 5:28: "But I say
unto you, That whosoever looketh on a woman to lust af-
ter her hath committed adultery with her already in
his heart." In fact the "Pharisaic manner", against
which Jesus' s whole life and teaching was an unending
protest, was an emphasis on outer conduct rather than
inner control, as Dr. W. J. Lowstuter shows in his
brilliant interpretation of the Sermon on the Mount
(Lectures on "The Synoptic G-ospels," Boston Universi-
ty School of Theology.;. A similar fallacy lurks in
Weigle's statement (The Pilgrim Training Course , First
Year, p. 163, as quoted by Shaver, Present -Day Trends
in Religious Education
, pp. 37-38: "The only true pre-
paration for life is life itself; the only effective
training for service is to serve In the moral
and spiritual realm there is no genuine expression save
that of deeds. It leaves one grateful for Browning's
redeeming stanza from "Rabbi Ben Ezra": "All I could
never be, All men ignored in me, That was I worth to
God, Whose wheel the pitcher shaped."
4
self, 12 e. the ideal self God in experience
molding character comes to expression. It isn't
that G-od ought to "be in experience, "but that he is;
It isn't that men ought to be free spirits; they
1
are. Religious Education is the process by which G-od
and men work together an ethical mysticism of the
sort commended by Ritschl -— to realize themselves,
i.e. the ideal values, freedom, goodness, immortali-
ty, which they essentially are; for:
That which abides,
When other beauties fade,
That which is light
When all beside is shade,
That which lives on
When dustier passions die,
Is G-od in us
G-ood-morrow, Friend.
G-oodbye.
2
Here, for once, poetry is not only illustra-
tion but partial demonstration. This "Elegy" reveals
the extent to which morality is grounded in religion by
suggesting: 1.) That "A good G-od is," as Charles R.
Brown insists, "the only intellectually respectable
guarantee of immortality," the goal of biology as well
as theology; 2.) That ideal s^ through which men make
1. Cf. I John 3:2: "Beloved, now are we the sons
of G-od;" also Harry Emerson Fosdick's sermon from that
text, published in The Church Monthly, January, 1929.
2. Cf. the original meaning of the expression,
"G-od-be-wlth-ye".
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their contribution to the attainment of this goal,
must eventually be referred to a God, who is vividly
immanent in the processes of their conception and a-
chievement. This is made more rigorously apparent in
the following chart, "Ideals Traced to their Source
God":
PSYCHOLOGICAL
FACTORS
BIOLOGICAL
;
FACTORS
!
CONTRIBUTIVE
'
;
CURRICULUM
NORMATIVE
METHODS
RELIGIOUS
I
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\
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Brain and
1 Spinal Cord
• «
1 i
l
i
i
1 Science |
1
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i
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j
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1 Church History
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Feeling
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I
Nervous System
i i
i i
I
Music i
i Art i
1 Literature i
I )
Education
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I
Ritual Appreciation 1
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i Impulses and
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•
I
History
<
1 Biography
f Sociology i
k I
1 1
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of
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Character Conduct i
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Religious Education, thus defined and
Conclusions grounded, should "be acceptable not on-
ly to its present exponents but also to
its most ardent detractors, tender-minded mystics on
the one side, and "tough-minded" scientists on the
other; for:
A. It is rational evangelism, scientifically
grounded:
Religious Education, properly understood,
seeks the same end sought by mystics and evangelists,
the introduction of G-od into experience in such a
way as to renew courage and form or reform character;
it even employs the emotional method of revivalism
but with a significant difference: it recognizes and
utilizes the emotions without compromising them or
considering them an exclusive approach to religious
experience. Shaver admirably expresses its attitude
1
when he says :
"One must say it to the credit of those
who fostered the appeal through the emoti-
ons that they were seeking to produce an
experience which reached to the inner depth
of life. The fact that the experience lost
much of its apparent vitality because it
was exclusively emotional we must admit.
But the sincere purpose to produce in the
1. Present -Day Trends in Religious Education,
P. 34.

individual, adult or child, an experience
which would result in effective Christian
living is to be commended."
Moreover its method here, as in other approaches, is
dictated not by uncriticized enthusiasms, exotically
or hypnotically induced, but by doctrines deduced from
biology, sociology, and psychology. Parenthetically,
that task is "tough" enough to commend its pursuit,
if not its findings, to even the "hardest" scientist.
B. It gives Christianity an intellectual respec-
tability, which enables it confidently to advance its
claims over those of competing world-religions:
In a sense Religious Education does for
Christianity today what St. John and Justin Martyr
did for it in antiquity. As they reconciled the teach-
ing of Jesus with the prevailing science and philoso-
phy of their era, the Logos doctrine, so Religious
Education not only recognizes but utilizes for Chris-
tian ends whatever is valid in evolution, relativity,
eugenics, euthenics, G-estalt-psychology, pragmatism,
and personalism. At the same time it leaves the G-od
revealed in Jesus, mystically and ethically, what he
was in "The Gospel of John" "In the beginning was
the Word " and for Justin Martyr an idea
coming to expression in a light -giving life; also

what he is to Albert Schweitzer, whose books, The
Quest of the Historical Jesus and Christianity and the
Relig ions of the World , are significant recent treat-
ments of this subject:
1
"He comes to us," he says of Jesus,
"as One unknown, without a name, as of old,
by the lakeside, He came to those men who
knew him not. He speaks to us the same
word: ''Follow thou me! 1 and sets us to the
tasks which He has to fulfil for our time.
He commands. And to those who obey Him,
whether they be wise or simple, He will re-
veal Himself in the toils, the conflicts,
the sufferings, which they shall pass
through in His fellowship, and, as an inef-
fable mystery, they shall learn in their
own experience Who He is."
C. It makes religion, more than participation
in worship, the achievement of progressively higher
moral values, including, perhaps, immortality:
This latter fact makes Religious Education
especially adaptable to the maintenance and advance-
ment of Christianity, the unique emphasis of which
has always been on personal immortality. As early as
165 A.D. Lucian, writing about Christian friends of
2
one, Peregrlnus, said :
"Why, these poor wretches have per-
suaded themselves that they are going to be
every whit immortal and live forever; where
-
1. Christianity and the Religions of the World
,
P. xv, quoted from The Quest oT~the Historical Jesus .
2. See J. H. Wright, Masterpieces of greek Lite -
rature
, Boston, Houghton-Mifflin, 1902,"p. b$6.

fore they both despise death and volunta-
rily devote themselves to it the most
of them. Moreover their first law-giver
persuaded them that they are all brethren
one of another, when once they come out
and reject the gods of the G-reeks, and wor-
ship that crucified sophist, and live ac-
cording to his requirements. Therefore
they esteem all things alike as of small ac-
count, and regard their property as common,
having received such ideas from others,
without any adequate basis for 1heir faith.
If , then, any cheat came among them and a
trickster able to manage things, in a very
short time he got ever so rich, laughing in
his sleeve at these unsophisticated folk,"
This suggests also the method which Religi-
ous Education still finds most efficacious in the pro-
pagation of Christianity, the translation of the 1-
deals of "a crucified sophist" into lives of similar
faith, courage, and redeeming sympathy.
D. It is an agency working to restore what Prin
cipal L. P. Jacks has appropriately called "the lost
radiance of religion":
"It was in the form of a person," he
writes, "that the radiance of Christianity
made its first appearance and its first im-
pression on the world. It has a kinship
with Beauty, but it stands for a Beauty so
different from any other with which we are
familiar that even that pregnant word does
not carry us very far. And yet it is no
travesty of our religion to say that its
power to move us lies in the vision it
brings of a hidden beauty in the world, pre-
sent even in the depths of pain and sorrow,
and nowhere else so poignantly present as
there, the sight of which is so encouraging,

30 invigorating, so exhilarating, that
life and conduct are immediately raised to
its own levels, and we ourselves become
dispensers of it, with a new mastery over
fate and circumstances
,
conquerors and
more than conquerors over these light af-
flictions that are "but for a moment.
Christianity did more than tell us some-
thing new and refreshing about the nature
of God. It told us something new and re-
freshing about the nature of the universe
of which we are living parts. 71
1
(The italics here are added, as in subse-
quent quotations from Principal Jacks' s book, by the
author of this dissertation to show to what extent
Principal Jacks' s ideas of Religious Education con-
form with those elaborated here.)
"A ' light came into the world' —- so
the Fourth Gospel puts it not a light
shed from without, but a light that burns
within the heart of the world itself , trans-
figuring the whole length and breadth of ex-
istence, from what it seems to be to the eye
of sense into the fullness of its reality
the fitting abode of rejoicing and im -
mortal spirits, the Father's house of many
mansions, where music and dancing await the
regenerated soul, not only the music to
which we listen , but the dancing which re-
produces the music in the total movement of
our lives . This is what I mean, and nothing
less than this, when I speak of the radiance
of the Christian religion not an adventi -
tious quality, nor a mere alleviation or a-
dornment of a stern and uncompromising code
of duty, but an essential and all
-
pervading
energy , in which duty itself becomes a new
creation along with everything else, forgot-
ten as duty because it has been transformed
into love .
2
1. The Lost Radiance of the Christian Religion
New YorkTBoran, 1924, pp. 15~I5. 2. Ibid.7~pp.~T5-

And, eventually, having shown that this
light -^giving dynamic has been "lost" in much that
passes for "religion" today but is being restored by
1
education, Principal Jacks concludes :
"In the next generation there will
grow up, there is growing up even now, in
this country and in many others, a vast
unordained ministry of religion who will
find their mission at the teacher' s desk.
Along with this there is a hunger for
light which exceeds all existing means of
satisfying it. * * * Let us add our reso-
lution to theirs, thereby taking the first
step towards the recovery of the lost ra-
diance of the Christian religion. For of
one thing we may be assured. The struggle
for light will not stop at a first series
of discoveries. It will go on and on,
from point to point, from position to posi-
tion, from insight to insight, until the
fruits of the Spirit are possessed, the e-
ternal values revealed, the unsearchable
riches laid bare, the many mansions fully
opened, and the turmoil of life transfi-
gured and explained in the music and danc-
ing of an immortal v/orld.
"
1. The Lost Radiance of the Christian Religion
pp.
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